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 i 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Powerful, entrenched health care stakeholders played a major role in limiting the health 
reform initiative of the Government of Saskatchewan in the 1990s.  The politics of the 
decade was dominated by the fiscal crisis which prompted the government to embark on 
health care reform at the same times as it limited the scope of the reform.  The narrative of 
Saskatchewan‟s health reform efforts showed that the government focused on the politics of 
health care, specifically the need to manage the diverse and often competing interests of 
health care stakeholders.  It also reveals the dynamic between the stakeholders, the press and 
public opinion.  As health stakeholders expressed their concerns about health care reform, the 
press and the public became more critical and the government backed away from its 
commitment to health reform. 
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Preface 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Between 1991 and 1996 the Saskatchewan New Democratic Party (NDP) government 
of Premier Roy Romanow implemented Wellness, one of the most significant health reform 
initiatives undertaken by a provincial government.
1
  Wellness aimed to remake 
Saskatchewan‟s health system. Its key goals included: 
(1) ensuring health is a priority for all sectors of the province through the 
development of health public policies; 
(2) ensuring effective and affordable service delivery through the integration, 
coordination and consolidation of existing services;  
(3) empowering people, communities and health professionals by increasing 
meaningful participation in the system; 
(4) strengthening family and community-based support and community-based 
approaches as alternative to institutional care; 
(5)  enhancing health promotion and disease prevention to help people make 
healthy choices; 
(6)  maintaining essential and appropriate care services; 
(7)  developing alternative approaches, innovations and systems to enhance 
and support our new health system; and 
(8)  enhancing health research and evaluation to strengthen decisions about 
our health system.
2
 
 
As a result, Wellness was far reaching and, consequently, affected Saskatchewan‟s health 
stakeholder community.  
Understandably, reaction to Wellness was significant.  Yet, Saskatchewan‟s health 
stakeholders‟ initial response was not uniform: some supported the initiative, while others 
were opposed. Moreover, as Wellness evolved, so too did their views.  Unfortunately, the 
nature and importance of these stakeholders, their dynamic and complex relationship with 
Saskatchewan‟s government, and their shifting views have been overlooked in the scholarly 
analysis of Saskatchewan‟s 1990s health reform experience. Thus there is an imperfect 
understanding of how and what shaped the Wellness agenda and why the desired policy 
outcomes failed to emerge. This thesis enhances previous scholarly work on Wellness by 
inserting Saskatchewan‟s health stakeholders into the story to demonstrate that they were a 
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central, catalyzing element of the health reform process, and that the NDP government 
understood their importance and molded health reform accordingly.  
Although much has been written about the evolution of Canadian health policy, this 
thesis is not about changing health policy, but it is about the politics of health care.  It argues 
that Saskatchewan‟s health reform policy, or Wellness, was shaped by two key forces outside 
the control of government: a fiscal crisis and Saskatchewan‟s health stakeholder community.  
This thesis will also document the dynamic relationship among stakeholder views of 
Wellness, press coverage of it and public reactions to the reform initiative and the 
government. 
Political scientist Harvey Lazar indicated that it is necessary to acknowledge that 
once a policy direction has been chosen, its implementation is shaped by a number of forces 
internal and external to the control of government.
3
 It is, according to Lazar, these external 
forces which prove to be the main variable in determining the size of reform and whether 
reform‟s implementation will succeed.  A number of scholars support this view and 
collectively have identified key forces to be interested groups (i.e. affected stakeholders, 
policy community, media opinion, etc.) and external dynamics (i.e. fiscal restraint, economic 
indices, institutional structures, etc.).
4 
 When these factors converge they exert significant 
pressure on governments and force them to implement a new, or shift or end an existing 
policy direction. A tradeoff was noted by political scientist Ellen Immergut in her study on 
the health policy experience of three European countries. She observed that when faced with 
similar conflict from the health stakeholder community, different forms of institutions led 
governments to adjust their policy decisions and that each government did so out of political 
convenience as opposed to sound policy.
5
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The idea that tradeoffs and intermediation are an integral part of the policy process 
recognizes that governments are not the only actors involved.  Nor do governments restrict 
their interactions to only one or two powerful actors.  A more representative model, 
therefore, is that of a policy community which suggests a broader set of actors and groups are 
involved in the policy process and that their intermediations are complex. While the term 
“policy community” is a much discussed one, for the purposes of this study the work of two 
sets of Canadian political scientists will be used.  William Coleman and Grace Skogstad 
argued that a policy community, such as that within the health sector, consisted of a set of 
actors, public and private, that coalesced around an issue and shared a common interest in 
shaping its development over the long run.
6
 Similarly, Paul Pross defined a policy 
community as  “…groupings of government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and 
individuals, including academics, who for various reasons, have an interest in a particular 
policy field and attempt to influence it.”7 Pross‟ community represented the large milieu of 
policy making activities in a specific field. 
Pross then divided the members of his community, based on their relative positions in 
the decision making process, into the sub government and attentive public. The sub 
government was composed of relevant government departments, institutional groups and 
organizations routinely involved in the policy development process.
8
 The attentive public 
was a loosely defined group representative of those indirectly affected by or associated with 
the policy process. While very attentive to the policy process, they only become involved 
when necessary.
9
  
In Saskatchewan during the 1990s, the health community consisted of a complex, 
dynamic population of stakeholders.  The sub government was a sizeable, robust collection of 
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interests, many of whom were well-established and well-funded.  Hospitals, health boards, 
powerful groups like the Saskatchewan Union of Nurses (SUN), the Saskatchewan Medical 
Association (SMA), health labour  unions (i.e. Service Employees International Union 
[SEIU] and Canadian Union of Public Employees [CUPE]), and health advocacy groups, 
such as the  Cancer Society were included. Two members of the sub government, SUN and 
the SMA, towered above others in size and power and thus had an important role in the 
reform process.   
In 1991SUN, a highly organized and militant union represented the majority of 
Saskatchewan‟s 9,507 registered nurses and the largest percentage of the health workforce. 
Nurses were also the primary employee group in hospitals (acute care), long-term and home 
care facilities.
10
  Since SUN‟s inception it had participated in nine sets of labour negotiations, 
led five strike votes and four strikes - 1974, 1976, 1988 and 1991.
11
   SUN was also an active 
participant in the acrimonious union rivalries involving CUPE and the Saskatchewan 
Government Employees Union (SGEU) that characterized health sector bargaining relations.   
All three represented professional nursing staff.  
SUN‟s approach to reform was pragmatic.  It believed that historically the 
government had catered to physician‟s demands and would continue to do so. Hence it 
worried that health reform was nothing more than acute care cutbacks and token cost 
restraint.
12
 Yet, SUN was also supportive of the principles of Wellness. Moreover, reform 
could be an answer to nurses‟ longstanding demands.13  These included increased wages, 
shorter hours, reduced workloads and recognition for their growing responsibilities and 
central role in patient care.
14
  Hence, as long as reform delivered these benefits to nurses, 
they were a potential powerful, supportive voice.  
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Saskatchewan‟s 1,495 physicians, represented by the Saskatchewan Medical 
Association (SMA), were the other major stakeholder in Saskatchewan‟s health system.15 
While physicians represented 6.7 percent of Saskatchewan‟s health providers,16 they were 
responsible for 85 percent of total expenditures through their control over referrals to 
specialists and hospital admissions.
17
  Over the years, government payments to physicians 
had increased substantially due to a growth in physician numbers and corresponding 
utilization.
18
 
Physicians feared that Wellness would erode their incomes, attack their fee-for-
service remuneration, and compromise their autonomy.
19
  Yet, physicians also viewed 
Wellness positively.  It offered improved system efficiency and service coordination. More 
importantly, physicians were confident that the government would not act imprudently.  
Simply, there was a history of past governments avoiding confrontation, in large part, 
because the 1962 Medicare strike had left an indelible scar on government-physician 
relations and on the public of Saskatchewan.
20
  Also, physicians‟ willingness to defend their 
interest had in recent years been demonstrated by very public, confrontational job actions in 
other provinces.   
Saskatchewan‟s health community also contained a large attentive public, including 
the public at large, the media and numerous ad hoc groups ready to materialize in response to 
specific issues and concerns. During Wellness this attentive public became influential 
participants in the policy discussion.   
An example of a very important ad hoc group that emerged was the province-wide 
Rural Health Coalition (RHC), which represented the interests of communities in rural 
Saskatchewan.  Often times, rural communities, defined as rural centres with fewer than 
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5,000 people, organized themselves to advance their political interests. An example of this 
approach is the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM). The 
rationalization of health services that was part of Wellness hit rural communities especially 
hard; for instance, 51 of the 52 hospitals closed in 1993 were in rural locations. The vast 
majority of these communities expressed their disapproval of Wellness in newspapers, 
petitions and with public protests.  Since the government held many of these seats it was 
concerned about its future electoral prospects, and thus paid close attention to rural views and 
concerns. This made all communities in rural Saskatchewan important, but it also elevated 
the status of ad hoc groups opposed to Wellness, such as the RHC. 
Other noteworthy members of the attentive public included urban communities and 
the public-at-large. Each shared similar concerns over hospital and bed cuts and likewise 
responded with petitions or by forming coalitions such as the Concerned Citizens for Health 
Care in Prince Albert.  Importantly, the media was a central messenger for the sub 
government and attentive public, and as well, a key commentator on Wellness. This 
commentary became a bellwether for the government.   
Political scientist Antonia Maioni discovered in her research that ad hoc actors, or 
external organizations such as labour, farmer and church groups, and political parties, were 
the forging forces of Medicare.
21
 Their continued involvement and pressure upon 
governments ensured the politicization of health care and explained why non health 
stakeholders were an important element in the reform story and in Pross‟ attentive public.  
While the health community concept captured the vibrant nature and complexity of 
the province‟s health environment, the term stakeholder and its related theory is a relevant 
tool to describe individual participants of this community. The leading scholar in the field, 
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R.Edward Freeman, defined stakeholders as groups or individuals who affect and are affected 
by a policy objective.
22
  The term stakeholder includes a broad base of people made up of 
those who do, and those who do not expect to make personal gains in their issue advocacy. 
This aptly represents the breadth of Saskatchewan government-health stakeholder relations. 
Wellness awoke both organized health stakeholders and unorganized latent stakeholders who 
fit within Pross‟ sub government and attentive public constructs. 
Health stakeholders were also not a homogeneous group. That is they represented a 
mixture of different views and played differentiated roles in the policy process.  A 
stakeholder‟s support for a policy direction was linked to its self interest. So long as they 
could accrue benefits, no matter the extent of the changes, stakeholders remained supportive. 
Thus, during Wellness some stakeholders supported reform‟s direction because they gained, 
while others opposed because they lost. Moreover, their views were not fixed.
23
  With each 
new policy direction or decision by the government, a stakeholders‟ reaction to reform 
shifted as the associated benefits disappeared or improved. This meant that Saskatchewan‟s 
health community held divided opinions throughout most of the evolution of Wellness.  As a 
result, a window of opportunity existed for reform. The window closed when stakeholders 
unified their opposition in 1996. 
Another important variable in reform policy making, and especially in health policy, 
is that it is a political process. Governments, and in particular politicians, must be able to 
muster support for their decision.  Political scientist, Michael Howlett, noted that policy 
shifts are the outcome of interactive processes and balancing acts between power 
relationships and prevailing ideologies.
24
 The end goal is to achieve a more or less lasting 
solution with limited stakeholder-stakeholder and government-stakeholder conflict.
25
 This 
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means that each stakeholder, including the government, will not only act independently, but 
will negotiate, refine positions and identify compromises to suit its particular views.  
The NDP government understood the intricate and sensitive nature of its relationship 
with stakeholders. An examination of Saskatchewan‟s health reform story illustrated that the 
NDP government, from the very beginning, knew health reform would be intensely political 
and that the government needed to lead and manage the process.
26
   Saskatchewan‟s health 
sector represented the province‟s largest workforce and health sector wages consumed 
between 60 and 70 percent of all provincial government health expenditures.
27
  Nine well-
organized and well-financed unions represented a large majority of these health care workers, 
with 95 percent as members of only three of the unions:  CUPE, SEIU and SUN.
28
 Many 
health stakeholders were also members of professional associations.  These associations 
elevated health workers status, and gave them access to higher wages and more 
responsibility, and a more powerful voice. In some cases, health stakeholders belonged to 
both a professional association and a union since unionization provided a channel to promote 
their professional demands.
29
  As a result, Saskatchewan‟s health policy process occurred 
within a very volatile setting consisting of many stakeholders.   
Moreover, this stakeholder community, especially physicians and nurses, possessed 
significant credibility with the public relative to politicians, and because stakeholders were 
organized, they became the main commentators on the health reform process. Thus, their 
public support or neutrality or opposition powerfully impacted upon the media and the 
public‟s views of reform. The sheer size of the health stakeholder community, an enduring 
resentment over Saskatchewan‟s bitter Medicare strike thirty years prior, a propensity to 
strike and high levels of union and professional militancy made it formidable. As a result, by 
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the 1990s Saskatchewan‟s government-stakeholder relations existed in a state of constant 
tension that had impeded and continued to impede, needed policy shifts.
30
 Equally, changing 
the health system required more than sound policy; it required a focus on the political 
management of stakeholders.
31
  
By 1991, this longstanding status quo was no longer tenable mainly because it was no 
longer financially sustainable.  While it is true that the government‟s decision to proceed 
with Wellness was influenced by the fact that the health system was disorganized, inefficient 
and unable to provide efficacious care for Saskatchewan people, it is critical to remember 
that previous governments had been told in various reports about these problems, but had 
failed to take decisive action.  What was different in the 1990s was that the fiscal crisis in the 
province and the financial problems with health care left the government little choice but to 
take bold action. Reform therefore became Saskatchewan‟s policy tool for managing 
uncontrolled health expenditures.  
Change, as political scientist Stephen Tomblin observed, is difficult to bring about in 
entrenched health systems when an “…old regime remains strong, underlying structural 
conditions do not change, and there is little opportunity to contest established 
monopolies….”32 In this type of environment, political scientist Carolyn Tuohy and Tomblin 
suggested that change was only possible alongside a critical juncture,
33
 or a marshalling 
force.
34
  This force or juncture could be the arrival of a new more powerful health 
stakeholder dominant enough to shift the balance of power, or alternatively, an external 
power or shock sufficient to coerce change.  The NDP government found the necessary 
motivation for health reform in the form of Saskatchewan‟s fiscal crisis.35   
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The fiscal crisis was the critical event or marshalling force that overturned the health 
system‟s status quo and supplanted health stakeholders‟ interests. This crisis forced the 
government towards the difficult components of Wellness.  Thus reform became the policy 
tool for managing uncontrolled health expenditures. It involved comprehensive change - 
increased efficiency, management and accountability, and cost-cutting - embedded within 
structural reorganization, realignment of the system away from the medical model and 
towards a focus on health promotion, and prevention and community-based care.
36
 
Consequently, restoring fiscal stability to the province went hand-in-hand with reforming the 
health system. 
The context for this thesis is the fiscal crisis of the 1990s and the role of stakeholders 
in health reform.  Much of the literature on the fiscal crisis of the 1990s focuses on the 
origins of the crisis and its magnitude.
37
 By the 1990s interest on the federal government‟s 
public debt was growing at an unsustainable and alarming rate of $100 million a day and in 
January 1995 the internationally recognized business newspaper The Wall Street Journal 
published an editorial entitled “Bankrupt Canada?” 38 At the federal level, the fiscal crisis 
was addressed in the 1995 federal budget which included dramatic cuts in spending, 
including major reductions in funding for health care and other social programs.
39
 At the 
provincial level, a major financial publication wrote in 1992 that the “…fiscal situation 
ranges from painful in Quebec, to ghastly in Ontario to terrifying in Saskatchewan.”40 The 
fact that Saskatchewan‟s total debt was $14.8 billion, the highest per capita debt in all of 
Canada,
41
 meant that the province faced a fiscal crisis that required immediate and bold 
action. The 1992 and 1993 budgets introduced dramatic spending cuts and tax increases 
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which were widely supported by the public which had come to understand the magnitude of 
the fiscal crisis and the need for action.
42
  
The literature on the fiscal crisis in Saskatchewan is similar to the material about the 
national scene:  it focuses primarily on the magnitude of the problem and the measures 
adopted to address the crisis.  Janice MacKinnon‟s work is a well-researched account of the 
origins of the crisis and an insider‟s view of how the Romanow government dealt with the 
daunting task of eliminating the deficit. 
43
 However, the focus is on the cuts made, rather than 
the opportunities presented by the fact that the public supported the need for bold action in 
the name of deficit reduction.  Also, the book is more narrative than analytical and it says 
little about health care reform.  
 Another book on the topic is Deficit Reduction in the Far West: The Great 
Experiment, contains articles on the handling of the deficit reduction in Canada‟s three most 
western provinces. 
44
 One article by Richard H.M. Plain compares health reform, health care 
spending and health status in the three provinces and concluded that “Saskatchewan 
developed the prototype model for the rapid and successful reform of a provincial medicare 
system.”45  Plain focuses on regionalization and the development of needs-based funding as 
the major achievements of Saskatchewan‟s reform initiative, while he pointed out that the 
government failed to make progress in changing the way doctors were paid and he noted that 
the health status of Saskatchewan people declined during the deficit reduction period.  While 
interesting, Plain‟s work said nothing about the role of health stakeholders in the reform 
process and he mentioned that deficit reduction was a driving force in the government‟s 
decision to embrace reform without providing a detailed explanation of his argument.  
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Another publication that linked deficit reduction and health reform is an article by 
Duane Adams, the deputy minister of health who oversaw the Wellness process.  Adams 
linked deficit reduction and health reform.
46
  He argued that deficit reduction and health 
reform competed for pre-eminence on the government‟s agenda and the victory of deficit 
reduction meant that the fiscal crisis helped to undermine Wellness; for instance, there was a 
fundamental contradiction between Wellness‟s emphasis on community decision-making and 
the unilateral decision by the government to close 52 hospitals. Adams emphasized the 
constraints placed on health care reform by the fiscal crisis but ignored the opportunities 
presented by the fact that the government had to take bold action and the public was 
receptive to such action in the name of deficit reduction. Also, Adams failure to comment on 
the government‟s management of its health stakeholders leaves a large gap in his analysis.  
His personal involvement in the health reform process may have made him reluctant to admit 
that the government was methodical, even ruthless in its management of Wellness. 
 Hence, what is lacking in the literature on deficit reduction and health reform is an 
understanding of the opportunities presented by the fiscal crisis. The single most important 
reason when the Romanow government embraced health reform, while other governments 
had failed to act, was the fiscal crisis facing Saskatchewan and the fiscal problems with 
provincial health spending.  Moreover, in its messaging the government effectively used the 
fiscal crisis to garner public support for health care reform.  
The fiscal crisis in Saskatchewan was acerbated by the unsustainable increase in 
health care costs.  The fiscal problem with health care was documented in an article by Paul 
Boothe and Mary Carson and in a piece by Janice Mackinnon, entitled “The Arithmetic of 
Health Care.”47 Health care spending is unsustainable since it is growing at a faster rate than 
Chapter 1: Introduction  13 
the growth of revenue of any government in Canada.  Hence, it takes a bigger and bigger 
piece of the government spending pie, with the eventual result being that 100 percent of 
government budgets would have to be devoted to health care.  Ontario Premier Dalton 
McGuinty highlighted the unsustainability of health care costs: he said, “There will come a 
time when the Ministry of Health is the only Ministry we can afford to have and we still 
won‟t be able to afford the Ministry of Health”.48 An additional problem is that the growth in 
health care spending has crowded out funding for other areas such as education and poverty 
reduction programs which are essential to promoting a healthy population. 
What has been overlooked in the work of Boothe, Carson and MacKinnon is the fact 
that while the fiscal crisis of the 1990s was acute, the fiscal problems with health care were 
chronic.  That is, by the early 1990s the fiscal situation of provinces like Saskatchewan had 
deteriorated to the point that there was doubt about the government‟s ability to borrow 
money to fund its operations.  For this reason, immediate action was essential. In contrast, 
while the government had to act to limit the growth in health care spending, the fiscal 
problems in health care unfolded gradually over an extended period of time and could, 
therefore, be left for future governments to tackle. Thus, while the fiscal crisis opened the 
door to health reform, the improvement in the province‟s finances and the resulting 
aggressive resistant by stakeholders made it easier for the government to abandon health care 
reform and leave it for another day. 
As well as the fiscal crisis, the role of stakeholders in the health reform process 
provides the other main context for this thesis. As mentioned previously, the emphasis in the 
thesis is on the politics of health reform.  There is a vast body of literature on the public 
policy issues involved in health reform. Though interesting, this literature focuses on the 
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content and not the context of reform. Thus it does not provide the foundation for this thesis.  
Instead, the focus is on the stakeholder groups involved in health care and the dynamic that 
played out between them and the government as Wellness unfolded. 
What is remarkable in the literature on health reform in the 1990s is how little 
attention has been paid to the implementation process of health reform and the role of health 
stakeholders in that process.  The extensive research on health reform by Greg Marchildon, 
Deputy Minister to the Premier (1996 – 2000) in Saskatchewan‟s NDP government focused 
on policy issues.  Though he acknowledged the importance of the fiscal crisis, Marchildon 
preferred to analyze the tenets of the NDP government‟s policy objectives - community 
empowerment, wellness and regionalization.  He said little about the actual implementation 
of the reform and the role of health stakeholders.   Like Adams, he gave short shrift to the 
fact that the implementation of Wellness involved a well planned and strategic process 
centred on enhancing government control, improving costs and service efficiency and 
accountability, and reducing the power of stakeholders.   
Kevin O‟Fee, another participant in Saskatchewan‟s reform, offered a detailed 
discussion on federal provincial relations and the fiscal crisis, ably noting the historical 
importance of each and how it contributed to Saskatchewan‟s 1990s health funding 
problems. The other valuable aspect of his work was the extensive interview with Duane 
Adams that provides an “insiders” view of the management and goals of Wellness and in 
particular of the contradiction between Wellness` holistic health system goals and the harsh 
fiscal goals.  Unfortunately, he like others failed to obtain from Adams any sense of the 
governments‟ views and approach to stakeholders. More importantly, O‟Fee‟s provides only 
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a cursory analysis of events after 1993, when in fact, the more substantive streams of reform 
were implemented. 
Overall, these discussions suggested only a cursory consideration of health 
stakeholders‟ role in the reform process.  It may be that analyzing stakeholders required a 
more intimate understanding of their motivations than is possible from the senior level civil 
servant background of the aforementioned scholars. This may explain why labour scholar 
Kurt Wetzel provided the only informed discussion and analysis on health stakeholder 
experiences during Saskatchewan‟s health reform.  While Wetzel alluded to the importance 
of the fiscal crisis, his years working with unions enabled him to create a fuller analysis and 
as well, to speak directly to the motivations and views of Saskatchewan‟s stakeholders. They 
in essence, were not the enemy. In fact, Wetzel noted, health stakeholders supported many 
aspects of the reform and even believed Wellness to be necessary for both improving the 
system and for achieving their own goals.
49
 In addition, he attributed the government‟s 
successful implementation of reform to a proactive yet sympathetic stakeholder management 
approach that secured their buy-in for reform.  Wetzel also suggested that the process failed 
because the government could not manage the size of the changes and thus ease the fears and 
apprehensions of stakeholders.  While an insightful analysis, Wetzel‟s work failed to account 
for the depth of stakeholders‟ hesitance to reform and thus the fundamental role of the fiscal 
crisis in guiding stakeholders through the reform process.  Moreover, while stakeholders 
acknowledged the need for change, he fails to note that these stakeholders reacted to reform 
because changes meant that under reform, the government intended to exercise more control 
and management over health stakeholders and the health system. 
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Political scientist Alan Davidson also failed to consider the role of the fiscal crisis in 
health reform in the 1990s. However, he is worth mentioning because he has provided the 
only analysis integrating health stakeholders into the reform story and specifically, the 
British Columbia‟s (BC) health reform story.  His role as a civil servant during BC‟s reform, 
better informs his understanding of the mechanics of health reform that can be applied to 
Saskatchewan‟s experience. Davidson argued that BC‟s reform efforts clearly intended to 
attack health stakeholder‟s preeminent position in the BC health system and gain control of 
the health system.  The government wanted to reduce the power and authority of health 
ministry bureaucrats, health care managers, and health care professionals.
50
 Knowing 
resistance was inevitable, BC used a methodical process to gain public support to overcome 
stakeholder resistance. This included promotion of community based local boards and terms 
like health promotion. Unfortunately, Davidson‟s articles were too brief to provide an in-
depth analysis of the role of stakeholders in reform and an understanding of the dynamics of 
the reform process. 
Thus, the fiscal crisis and the dominant role played by stakeholders in health reform 
provide the framework for this thesis. Wellness was a fiscal agenda which intended to curb 
unsustainable spending and infuse more control over the health system, couched within a 
broader framework of health reform.
 51
  Cost cutting and cost management increased 
efficiency. Accountability was the end product of reorganization and needs-based funding. A 
realignment of the system away from the medical model and towards a focus on health 
promotion and prevention grew from greater community engagement.  
Stakeholder resistance was understandable.  Sociologist Harley Dickinson posited, by 
its nature health reform would alter government-stakeholder relations and entrenched 
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stakeholder structures.
 52
  Achieving health reform therefore required government 
management of stakeholders and it is here that the true ingenuity and distinguishing feature 
of the NDP government‟s health reform story emerges. The NDP provided political 
leadership to a highly politicized health environment and policy process.
53
   Accordingly, a 
strategic approach to stakeholder management became the most important mechanism of the 
NDP government‟s Wellness initiative.  On the whole, the government`s goal was to prevent 
health stakeholders from derailing Wellness‟ agenda.  Deputy Minister of Health Duane 
Adams noted that containment of stakeholders was essential as the government understood 
that there could not be “…meaningful reform of the health system without diminishing and 
constraining the negative effects of…vested interests.”54  This necessitated the creation of a 
strategic, yet flexible, well planned process that respected each stakeholder‟s behaviours, 
interests, motivations, relations and resources.
55
  The narrative of Saskatchewan‟s Wellness 
experience illustrated that the NDP government‟s strategy for implementing health reform 
was straightforward and focused primarily on the management of the political nature of the 
process and of health stakeholders.  
One of the first steps was to protect the already established good will between the 
government and the majority of health stakeholders.   A long-standing alliance between the 
NDP party and organized labour tempered initial and potentially devastating resistance. 
Stakeholders were convinced, based on the NDP‟s history as the founders of Medicare and 
its past relations with labour, that Wellness‟ goals could coincide with their own.  As long as 
this alignment existed stakeholders either supported or were neutral towards the 
government‟s health reform agenda. Consideration of these relations remained a constant 
element of Saskatchewan‟s health reform.  
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Another key mechanism employed from the beginning was communications and 
messaging.  Communications with the public and stakeholders aimed to garner support for 
the Wellness process and goals.  A more important tool was messaging, with its multiple of 
purposes. First and foremost, it linked health reform to the fiscal crisis and ensured everyone 
accepted the legitimacy of the crisis and thus the inevitability of reform.
56
  This galvanized 
health consumers‟ and citizens‟ support for health reform.57   So long as public support 
aligned with health spending restraint, stakeholders lost an important ally.
58
    
Messaging also focused on promotion of the positive aspects of health reform. 
Wellness‟ tag lines masked the harsh realities of the changes necessary. Across-the-board 
cuts to health were couched in holistic goals congruent with a broader community-based 
innovative health agenda. Prevention and promotion, and improvements to the social, the 
environmental and the economic factors impacting upon a person‟s health were 
emphasized.
59
 Saskatchewan‟s reformed system promised a better organized system that 
provided improved patient care and better utilized health professionals.
60
 Wellness offered 
Saskatchewan people and health stakeholders a better health system. Who would not support 
these lofty goals? Importantly, messaging assured people that Wellness was about more than 
cost cutting.  
Moreover, the government actively took ownership of the information on Wellness. A 
mountain of literature and supporting documents explaining and promoting health reform 
was developed and disseminated by the government.  Each of these pieces highlighted that 
health spending was unsustainable and reform of the health system was an imperative. 
Conflict with stakeholders was diffused via a proactive and wide-reaching political 
engagement process.
61
 At the beginning of the reform process, communities and health 
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stakeholders were invited to take part in shaping their reformed health system.
62
  Then 
throughout the process, health stakeholders, and especially organized labour, was welcomed 
onto committees.  As well, conferences were sponsored and public meetings held.
 63
  
Moreover, when an issue arose, the government formed another committee or held another 
discussion.  Essentially, the government strove to enhance understanding, build collaboration 
and maintain relationships.  
The government also demonstrated a willingness to be flexible with stakeholders. 
Stakeholders‟ concerns were accommodated when it was possible and in alignment with the 
power and influence of the stakeholder. This meant that the government‟s flexibility reflected 
a stakeholder‟s position in the hierarchy. Physicians and organized labour sat at the apex, 
with the unorganized at the bottom. SUN superseded CUPE and SEIU. Rural Saskatchewan 
received less consideration than physicians or nurses.  Unfair as it seemed, this approach 
effectively set the parameters for the compromises with stakeholders deemed necessary to 
see Wellness through.  Ultimately it also meant the government moved away from the more 
divisive elements of reform, such as salaried physician remuneration.    
Wellness‟ roll out was also preplanned, controlled and methodical.64 Although this 
contradicted the much ballyhooed community-based leadership of the process, the 
government appreciated that success essentially meant that reform‟s execution had to be 
organized.  Therefore reform was a process that unfolded in two stages with the transition to 
the second stage conditioned on completion of the first stage.
 65
 Notably, both stages 
imparted significant changes for stakeholders.  
The first stage, consisting of six pillars, was structural reform. Two pillars were put in 
place in the early months:  the Health Services Utilization Council (HSURC), a research 
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organization, and the Provincial Health Council (PHC), a health stakeholder council. 
Interestingly, both were research-based organizations which played a seminal role in 
providing an independent, credible voice supporting the tenets of Wellness and health 
reform.
 66
 These organizations stood as obstacles to anyone who challenged the value of 
Wellness.   
The unveiling in August 1992 of the concept paper, A Saskatchewan Vision for 
Health: A Framework for Change, was the third pillar. The document set out the fundamental 
beliefs, values and overarching goals for the reform process.
67
  As this was a prescription for 
reform, stakeholders and the public were left with little to attack and much to support. 
The fourth pillar was regionalization; one of the flagships of Wellness. This involved 
the merging of existing services and governance structures into new health districts. 
Community planning committees began work on forming health districts in early 1992, well 
before the release of A Saskatchewan Vision for Health. Regionalization was to be 
completed by August 1993.  Saskatchewan‟s health map would be redrawn and the plethora 
of autonomous long-standing health boards merged into a manageable number of larger 
health districts with a reduced number of boards.
 68
   This restructuring was heralded as a 
mechanism to eliminate redundancies, create economies of scale, improve local health 
services, and produce new levels of coordination and efficient provision of health services 
across the province.
69
  Regionalization also embraced home based care, which shifted 
patients out of expensive institutions and hospitals and into their homes.  As rural 
communities required health care, though not necessarily delivered via expensive hospitals, 
wellness centres were the answer to hospital closures in rural towns. 
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Once districts were in place, the fifth and other flagship of reform, needs-based 
funding, was implemented.  The new formula was a methodical population-needs approach 
that linked funding levels to the demographics and health care requirements of a local 
population.
70
  Previously, boards operated under an inefficient long-standing formula based 
on volume, services offered and historic expenditures, with no built in accountability 
mechanisms.
71
 Many scholars and health workers supported the needs-based approach as a 
better alignment of dollars to real service needs.
72
  More importantly, the formula enhanced 
oversight and local control by requiring community-elected Districts Boards to assess and 
then develop performance metrics for their communities; mechanisms by which the 
community could then hold them accountable.  Again, the formula was heralded as a 
theoretically sound tool that would lead to better services and use of health dollars. Likewise, 
the transfer of employees from the Department of Health to the districts, which coincided 
with the implementation of this new funding formula, logically followed as a mechanism to 
shift resources from the government into the hands of communities. Both the transfer and the 
funding formula had a completion date of April 1995.   
The final pillar was health board elections in late 1995.  These were championed as 
the machinery for community engagement. More importantly, they represented the handover 
of responsibility and ownership of health services, including responsibility for local health 
stakeholders, to local communities.  Elections also signaled the completion of stage one. 
Reform‟s focus then shifted to the second stage, the core of renewed primary health 
care and an equally divisive component of health reform.
73
 Based on contemporary leading 
edge research, this stage transitioned Saskatchewan‟s health system from the medical model 
to a population health and health promotion approach.
74
  Like many other streams of reform, 
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these concepts and approaches also had the support in principle of stakeholders in 
Saskatchewan‟s health community.  
Under primary health care many physician-provided services were to be delivered by 
ancillary health workers such as nurses and social workers. Moreover, primary health care 
promoted the integration of health services. Teams, not physicians, delivered health services 
and shared decision making responsibilities.  As a result physicians faced challenges to their 
scope of responsibilities, while ancillary workers saw new job classifications and career 
opportunities established.
75
 Wellness also promoted the adoption of new diagnostic testing, 
treatment methods and other advanced technologies, importantly, delivered by less costly 
technicians instead of physicians.   On the whole, these innovations better utilized existing 
skill sets such as those of nurses, while shifting emphasis (and resources) away from costly 
physician-based services to cost effective and less institutional community-based care such 
as home care.  
Health reform also opened the door to shifting physicians away from fee-for-service 
remuneration.  Many ancillary health workers advocated alternative physician remuneration 
schemes since, they argued, these schemes delivered more holistic health care relative to the 
existing system where physicians operated within the quantity versus quality based fee-for-
service payment mechanism. As well, a large number of stakeholders believed alternative 
schemes reduced physician‟s autonomy and authority, and thus dominance in the system, 
while increasing physician oversight and accountability. 
Finally, the government understood the dynamics and politics of Saskatchewan‟s 
health stakeholder community. Wellness and each of its pillars embodied significant negative 
change for health stakeholders. There was significant change, instability and uncertainty. For 
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example, the new funding formula was hard on rural communities as it decreased funding for 
many rural districts.  This translated into rural hospital bed closures and job cuts and, 
needless to say, elicited hostile reactions from rural people across the province. Likewise, 
regionalization led to the firing of hundreds of board members and hundreds of historically 
independent and at times competing communities were amalgamated.  Urban centres saw 
layoffs and service rationalization. 
As a result, efforts were made to avoid being heavy handed.  Appreciating that each 
stakeholder was motivated by self interest, the government first and foremost, worked to 
satisfy stakeholder interests, while at the same time counterbalancing one stakeholder against 
another.    For example, while ancillary health workers were excited by the new opportunities 
that reform offered for their own careers, the government understood that they – especially 
nurses – desired more responsibility and recognition. Where rural people were angered by the 
loss of their hospital and health services, the government offered funding to support the 
transition. More often however, this opposition was countered by stories of rural towns and 
communities who supported reform, who welcomed the change. When physicians grew 
alarmed by plans to introduce alternative remuneration plans under Wellness, they became 
more receptive to Wellness once the government backed down. Thus, reform was a process 
of give and take which had the effect of dividing the stakeholder community, and leading to 
stakeholders having differing views on reform, even after bed cuts and closures.
 76
   
More importantly, if the benefits of Wellness and catering to self interest failed to 
convince health stakeholders to continue to participate, the government adeptly returned to 
the fiscal crisis as the most important reason for enduring through the pain of reform. This 
context served to remind stakeholders, opinion leaders, the public and media that the 
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alternative was worse.  It is therefore worth reemphasizing that the province‟s fiscal crisis 
opened the door for the government to upend an entrenched system and powerful 
stakeholders.   
In its entirety, Wellness‟s expansive reforms resulted in far-reaching changes. It also 
increased the role and control of Saskatchewan‟s health system by the government.  
Regionalization centralized a previously decentralized, very community-based, and 
patchwork health system.
77
 Oversight and province-wide coordination by the government 
increased.  Needs-based funding allowed the government to retain control of setting the 
global funding levels for districts.  Moreover, reform enabled the government to decisively 
close 52 rural hospitals while rationalizing health services across the province. 
In the end the unwinding of health reform began with an improved provincial 
economy and the return of the government‟s financial health. Where the fiscal crisis opened 
the door to health reform, its disappearance effectively closed it. The easing of the fiscal 
pressures came as major stakeholders recognized that Wellness would not deliver promised 
benefits and held only more bad news (continuing job losses and increased workloads, 
attacks on member‟s autonomy and patterns of practice).  A once divided stakeholder 
community converged and became singularly focused on vigorously opposing health reform.  
With more credibility in the public arena than politicians, the concerns of physician and 
nurses, voiced in the media, led to increased public unease and then opposition to reform. By 
1996, the government could no longer contain its health stakeholders, the press was more 
critical of the reform initiative and together both turned public opinion against the 
government‟s reform agenda. As opposition to health reform increased the government‟s 
interest in pursuing reform abated. The dynamic between stakeholder opposition and public 
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opinion meant that by 1996 health reform had become a political liability for the government 
and this was the other main reason it was abandoned.  Wellness ended five years after it 
began, well short of becoming anything more than a regionalization and resource 
management exercise. 
As mentioned previously, the focus of this thesis is not on health care policy but on 
the politics of health care; hence, the sources relied upon are those most commonly used to 
study politics. Government documents and public statements by the Premier and Ministers 
were the main source for the government‟s perspective on reform.  Unfortunately these 
sources do not provide insight into the debate that may have occurred within government 
ranks.  However, this problem is unavoidable since all the documents on subjects such as this 
would be sealed because of their confidential nature.  Another excellent source used was the 
reflections of Duane Adams, who was deputy minister of health during the period of 
Wellness.  His own articles and his interviews in a thesis by Kevin O‟Fee provided a rare 
“insiders” view of the management of Wellness.  Hansard, which is the record of legislative 
debates and decisions, provided the best source for opposition reaction to reform and for 
studying the interaction between the government and opposition members. 
Polling and the media were an extremely important source.  It has to be stressed that 
the media sources were not evaluated on the basis of whether or not they accurately reflect 
events.  Since this thesis is about politics the media is important because of its role in 
molding and reflecting public opinion.  Most people relied on the media for their information 
about government initiatives like health reform and at least some read the editorial opinions 
and columnists‟ view of the government‟s decisions. Likewise, both the bureaucracy and 
government members carefully tracked media coverage of government‟s decisions. When the 
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legislature was sitting every government member received a daily package of media 
clippings covering newspaper and radio reporting.  Polls were the other main source used by 
the government to gauge public opinion. These sources are important as a barometer of 
public opinion. They track the changes in critical press coverage of Wellness and illuminated 
the declining public support for the initiative, on the one hand and the government‟s 
reluctance to pursue further changes, on the other hand.  
Lastly, a narrative and chronological approach has been adopted.  This approach 
illustrates firsthand the interactions among the stakeholders, the media, and the public and 
how these changed over time.  It also helps to depict the depth of anger and frustration by 
stakeholders with reform and why over time it was not possible for the government to 
manage the competing demands of the various stakeholders.  Essentially, the government‟s 
management of stakeholders worked initially but as fatigue and cynicism set in over health 
reform, the old practices no longer worked and health care reform had to be abandoned, 
especially when the fiscal crisis ended.  
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As overviewed in chapter one, significant policy shifts depend on external or 
marshalling forces to overcome a policy community‟s adherence to the status quo. Such was 
the case in Saskatchewan‟s health community in the 1990s. In spite of a myriad of serious 
system-wide structural and financial challenges and issues, health reform emerged because 
economic and fiscal forces overwhelmed stakeholder resistance.  Basically, until the 1990s 
fiscal crisis in Saskatchewan, politics trumped sound policy. 
This chapter, covering the first two years of reform, demonstrates that from the 
beginning of its reform process the NDP government understood that health reform was 
more than a policy decision. It required an understanding of, more importantly, the 
opportunity presented by the marshalling force of the fiscal crisis, then the influence, 
interests and positions of its health stakeholders, and lastly, the necessity of implementing a 
strategic approach that involved managing the character and course of the reform process.  In 
essence, the government grasped that reform was both a dynamic policy process and a 
political process.  What is more, the latter was more important than the former. 
By the election of 1991, with the Romanow NDP defeat of the Devine Conservative 
government, reform of Saskatchewan‟s health care system became inevitable. Devine‟s 
government had inherited a large, inefficient and expensive health system. Then he, like 
previous governments, failed to address these structural problems or to control health costs. 
Indeed, past governments used easy money from federal-provincial cost-shared programs to 
support the growth of the very problems with the system:  hospitals and a reliance on the 
medical model.  Ironically, even as these governments accepted these cost-shared funds, they 
expressed concern about health costs.  
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Devine appreciated that Saskatchewan‟s health system had expenditure problems and 
had even attempted to control health spending. However, political expediency impeded his 
efforts – keeping rural Saskatchewan and health unions content trumped the need for reform. 
Consequently, between 1982 and 1989, Saskatchewan‟s health expenditures grew to record 
levels.  The health budget grew at an average rate of approximately 9.6 percent annually,
1
  
more than the province‟s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth.  More importantly, 
Devine‟s health spending choices were a problem. Millions went to building new hospitals, 
renovating existing ones, and adding acute and long-term care beds across the province.
2
  
Hospital operating budgets increased in lockstep.  As a result, Saskatchewan had more beds 
and hospitals per capita than any Canadian province.
3
 Unfortunately, there was neither the 
rural population nor front-line staff and doctors to support these beds.
4
  As a result, when 
staff existed many either closed beds, or kept beds full and staff busy by increasing patients‟ 
average length of stay or by housing long-term care or chronically ill patients.
5
  Basically, 
Saskatchewan‟s health system grew at unsustainable rates with little correlation to improving 
the health of rural people. 
At the same time, Devine faced a federal government that believed that Medicare had 
become too expensive.  A program that cost $300 million in 1962 and $450 million by 1968, 
cost over $2 billion in 1976.
6
   As a percent of Canada‟s GDP, total health costs grew 
quickly, rising from 4.6 percent in 1960, to 8.5 percent by 1986.
7
  Public health care 
expenditures threatened to overwhelm the system. The federal government responded by 
capping its contributions to health costs, thus shifting health costs onto provinces. For 
Saskatchewan this proved to be significant. The province was experiencing record health 
spending.  At the same time, economic growth stalled as high interest rates, poor world 
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markets and a fall in commodity prices (grain, heavy oil, potash and uranium) converged 
with the misfortunes of nature (drought and an infestation of grasshoppers), reduced overall 
provincial government revenues.  
Instead of aggressively cutting spending over his nine years in government, Devine 
turned to annual budget deficits and debt to support spending. With respect to the problem 
area of the health system, his government commissioned numerous studies and reports. These 
latter efforts aimed to convince the public and health stakeholders to lessen demands for 
more services and money, and to identify better, more efficient mechanisms for delivering 
health services.  Devine also contemplated more emphasis on health promotion and 
population health, which, according to research, would improve the overall health of the 
population and result in cost savings.  These ideas were advocated in a report, A New 
Perspective on the Health of Canadians (1975), developed in 1975 by Marc Lalonde, a 
federal Minister of Health.   Lalonde encouraged governments to de-emphasize physicians 
and the medical model while investing in programs which created healthier lifestyles and 
better living environments.
8
   Adopting these programs, he proposed, created healthier people 
and thus saved the health system money. In a similar vein another federal minister, Jake Epp 
wrote Achieving Health for All (1986) which expanded on A New Perspective, emphasizing 
broader government investment in the social and economic determinants of health, such as 
housing and mental health programs.
9
   While both health promotion and population health 
received enthusiastic support from the health community, and even provincial governments, 
politics meant that the medical model and hospital infrastructure proved difficult to change.  
Devine, as well, lacked funds to support any new initiatives.   
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Devine‟s commissions and reports also met a similar fate, and most ended up shelved 
due to similar fiscal and political challenges. Nonetheless, each told a similar story about the 
problems in the health system. For example, in 1987 the Report on Enhancement of Regional 
Hospitals (Schwartz Report) called for the closure of Saskatchewan‟s system of small costly 
and inefficient rural hospitals.  In 1989, The Growth in Use of Health Services, verified that 
the growth in the government‟s health expenditures had been “...dramatic…”10 and needed to 
be curtailed.  Consensus Saskatchewan, a community based advisory group submitted a 
report that called Saskatchewan‟s health system inefficient, outdated and encumbered by 
escalating costs.  The Commission on Future Directions for Health Care (Murray 
Commission), reporting in 1990, became the final and most extensive effort. 
After extensive stakeholder and public consultation, the Murray Commission report 
described the Saskatchewan system as disorganized, inefficient, ineffective, and growing 
more costly by the year. At the same time, it had little impact on the health of Saskatchewan 
people.
11
  Of the Commission‟s 262 recommendations, three proved significant.12  The 
regionalization recommendation advocated merging over 400 discrete services, infrastructure 
and boards into 15 regional health-service divisions to reduce redundancies and to simplify 
convoluted management, governance and services.
13
 The report also recommended 
consolidation of Saskatchewan‟s 134 hospitals – especially rural hospitals and health services 
–  and a shift to home-based and community care to create a more cost effective and efficient 
system.
14
 A final recommendation called for the adoption of new technologies, alternative 
health care models and evidence-based outcome measures to update the health system‟s 
reliance on a costly physician-based medical model. Implementing all of the Commission‟s 
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recommendations, and these in particular, produced a better system, which was more 
effective, more humane and more cost effective.
15
 
None of these views were new.  By the 1990s, other provincial governments faced 
similar issues of affordability and effectiveness. Each searched for ways to bring their health 
system under control, and, each undertook studies, all of which arrived at the same 
conclusions.
16
 Health spending needed to be slowed to safeguard provincial health programs.
 
Physicians and the medical model were inefficient and costly.
17
 The system lacked 
integration and coordination and failed to provide a full continuum of care. Accountability 
did not exist.
18
 Moreover, the system placed the needs of stakeholders before that of the 
community.  Each report also stressed that more money could not fix the problems.   
In spite of all of these reports showing that health systems needed improvements and 
that Medicare in general needed to be changed, the Devine government stopped short of any 
significant action.  This hesitation came even though Devine faced support for reform, 
notably from stakeholders such as SUN and the SRNA, who called the possibility of change 
exciting,
19
 and the Canadian Mental Health Association along with others who felt frustration 
with the system‟s inefficiencies.20  Nonetheless, most health stakeholders feared change and, 
even more importantly for Devine, many rural communities responded with vigorous 
negativity.  These reports and recommendations doomed them to hospital closures, 
termination of health services and the loss of jobs in their communities.
21
 Thus under Devine, 
health reform‟s fate became a matter of political expediency. 
After ten years of poor spending decisions by the Devine government, both 
Saskatchewan‟s finances and its health system were in extremely poor shape.22  Nine years of 
annual deficits resulted in a significant and growing provincial debt, and meant that by 1991, 
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the province had one of the highest per capita debts in Canada and one of the lowest 
provincial credit ratings.
 23
   
The NDP opposition and even the public understood these facts.  A poll taken days 
before the 1991 election revealed that a failing economy, problems with agriculture, the 
deficit, unemployment, and taxation were all higher priorities than health care.  Health care 
sat sixth despite ten years of haphazard cuts to the system, increasing waiting lists, and the 
elimination of the School Dental Plan.
24
  People also appeared ready to shoulder health cuts 
if it meant restoration of the province‟s finances, improvements to the economy, and in the 
long run, improved health care. This became an important consideration for the Romanow 
government. 
As a result, during the 1991 election Romanow‟s NDP campaigned on a platform of 
responsible government.  Messages included a commitment to vision, sound leadership, and 
most importantly, a restoration of Saskatchewan‟s economic and fiscal health.25 Furthermore 
Romanow vigorously cautioned voters that they should not have high expectations.  Change 
was imminent due to the province‟s poor finances.  He emphasized that people also needed to 
understand that health care had contributed to the poor fiscal state of the province, and so 
faced potential cuts too.
26
 Once elected, his government intended to review the province‟s 
finances to determine the availability of resources to support existing programs and new 
initiatives.
27
 Romanow also made clear his intentions to return the province to sound finances 
in his first term.
28
 
Romanow was true to his commitment. On December 2, 1991, two months after his 
landslide victory he established the Financial Management Review Commission (Gass 
Commission), with a mandate to review the province's financial situation.
29
  In February 
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1992, Gass verified the province‟s 1991/91 budget deficit at $975 million.30 The public debt 
sat at $12.07 billion;
31
 the highest per capita debt in the country. Without action the debt‟s 
continuing growth was imminent.  Simply, Gass proclaimed the government‟s spending to be 
unsustainable. It had to be brought under control or else the province faced dire 
consequences.
32
   
Thus, in February 1992, Romanow‟s cabinet understood three facts: the public debt had 
risen from $3.5 billion to approximately $13 billion over ten years, and continued to grow; 
the province‟s credit rating was low, hampering future access to financial markets; and 
affordability threatened social programs and public services.
33
 This knowledge led the 
cabinet to embark on an aggressive agenda focused on eliminating the deficit, promoting 
economic development, creating jobs, restructuring agricultural programs, and acting on 
health reform
34
 – all in the first term. Fiscal pressures necessitated harsh action. It was the 
only way for the government to have enough money to manage its immediate expenditure 
problems and then to be able to implement a social democratic agenda in the future.  
More importantly, Romanow‟s decision to include health care reform was self-
evident.  Health care spending represented approximately one-third of government 
expenditures and had grown faster than the province‟s GDP.  Thus a significant part of the 
government‟s deficit and debt problem arose from its spending on the health system.  
Moreover, the economic realities of the day and the escalating costs of Saskatchewan‟s 
approach to health care challenged both the long term sustainability of the system and of the 
provision of care. At the same time, these growing expenditures failed to create a comparable 
improvement in the health of the population.  In short, the dire fiscal and economic 
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circumstances ensured that health spending was targeted.  Romanow noted, “…there are no 
sacred cows - even in Saskatchewan, the birthplace of Medicare.”35   
Where the fiscal reality elevated the need for health reform, political necessity also 
justified health reform.  The already mentioned reports condemned Saskatchewan‟s health 
system as inefficient and ineffective.
36
  At the same time mountains of credible research 
supported viable options such as health promotion, population health,
37
 and health 
determinants.  In addition, almost all of Saskatchewan‟s health stakeholders supported these 
options as they both reduced costs and improved care.
38
 Notably, some supported these 
options because they shifted the system away from the medical model and physician 
dominance.
39
 The NDP too committed itself to these concepts and ideas when, in its 1989 
submission to the Murray Commission, it spoke of them as alternatives that the NDP 
supported.
40
   
Furthermore, the NDP opposition created its own Pandora‟s Box.  It relentlessly 
criticized Devine for failing to address the many problems in Saskatchewan‟s health system, 
and then proclaimed that once elected it intended to bring about the changes long sought after 
by health stakeholders.
41
 Moreover, the government used health change as a political tool.  
For example, in an effort to establish close relations with SUN, the NDP endorsed SUN‟s 
desire for changes to the health system.  Hence, the implementation of health reform by the 
NDP government was understandable; it was in fact a political inevitability. The stage was 
therefore set for broad reform rather than just cost cutting. 
The latter point was underpinned by the NDP government‟s philosophical 
foundations.  The NDP, as descendants of Medicare‟s legacy, was then held up as Medicare‟s 
legitimate reformers.
42
  Simply, many stakeholders believed that in the hands of the NDP 
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government, health reform entailed a new policy direction that embraced the tenets of 
Douglas‟ second stage of Medicare and was not just meant to cut and slash.43 It can be 
inferred that health stakeholders trusted reform in the hands of the NDP.  They also believed, 
given their close relations, the NDP intended to protect stakeholder‟s interests and to involve 
them in the reform process.  On the whole, this convergence of circumstances set the stage 
for moving the NDP government to health reform. 
Health reform began in earnest with the November 1991 appointment of Louise 
Simard as Minister of Health, and then the installation in December of Duane Adams as 
Deputy Minister of Health.
 44
   Adams immediately formed the Wellness Team,
45
  an internal 
group of officials from various departments knowledgeable about health policy. They were to 
do an extensive analysis on best practices in health delivery and then recommend a health 
reform strategy.
46
 The team was expanded in January 1992 to include seventeen individuals 
from the health policy community as the government began to reach out to stakeholders.
47
  
At the same time, the government initiated a province-wide stakeholder and 
community engagement process. This extensive communications process targeted hundreds 
of people, organizations and communities, and aimed to educate them about the need for a 
reformed system and then the options available.
 48
  It also intended to gain input on, and to 
solicit participation in, the design of Wellness.
49
  There were closed door meetings with SUN 
and the SMA, as well as with other stakeholders who held a view on health reform.
50
 These 
discussions began the important stakeholder engagement process that set Saskatchewan apart 
from other provincial reform efforts.  
In January 1992, for example, Adams spoke at the Saskatchewan Hospital 
Association meeting, providing numerous details on what a reformed health system looked 
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like. These details highlighted the extensiveness of reform. For example, the elimination of 
structural barriers and reorganization of the system, integration of services that included new 
ways of thinking and delivering services across the entire continuum,  a focus on wellness 
models, the implementation of programming and structures to meet demonstrated needs 
throughout the province and the system, and restructuring of the bureaucracy.
51
 His speech 
emphasized to the group that the current financial situation forced these changes, many of 
which should have been made years ago.
52
 Lastly his comments underscored that these 
changes aimed to be collaborative however, the interests of the public, not those of a 
particular professional group, institution or program guided the government‟s decision 
making.
53
 Thus, the government intended to implement reform with or without stakeholder 
support, and two factors – necessity and affordability – with the goal being to trim overall 
costs and redirect dollars to areas of need, were central.    
Interestingly, while Adam‟s proposed these as formative conversations, his comments 
suggested that the government had already developed a plan for the design of Wellness. In 
fact, in February it publicly hinted at a staged reform process.  As noted in an earlier chapter, 
the government spoke of stage one as creating the framework for the new system and 
included: system reorganization into the new health districts and new boards; establishment 
of the Health Services Utilization Research Commission (HSURC) and the Provincial Health 
Council (PHC); implementation of the new funding mechanisms; and the shifting of 
employees and services from the Department to districts.
54
  Stage one ended with the election 
of board members who then took responsibility for their district‟s management and health 
services delivery.
55
  At that point, the second stage commenced. It involved the shift to a 
broader, more integrated community-based and patient focused health system. 
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Establishing two independent arms-length organizations, HSURC (February 1992) 
and the PHC (announced in April 1992 but not operational until June 1993), early in the 
process, evidenced the government‟s strategic focus. Both offered third party empirical 
evidence on the problems within Saskatchewan‟s health system.56 As well, both advocated 
for a range of public policies solutions necessary to improve the overall health system and 
health of Saskatchewan people and communities.
57
 It was not a coincidence that the 
government and these organizations agreed on those policies. The government‟s 
recommendations were, like that of HSURC and the PHC, research based.  Both instead, 
provided independent voices counterbalancing the expected resistance of health stakeholder.  
Early in the process, the government also began working with key health boards on 
the formation of new health districts.
58
 Saskatoon, Regina and Prince Albert all expressed 
interest in moving ahead with reform. Notably, each was already discussing amalgamation in 
their regions, though these discussions proceeded slowly.  Institutional barriers and 
personalities impeded the process.  In February, the Saskatoon Health Services Authority 
(SHSA) became the first health district under the yet to be unveiled Wellness.
59
  The process 
went smoothly as the SHSA administrative leadership was very supportive of amalgamation.  
Previous studies on Saskatoon‟s health services validated the value of coming together.60  
Moreover, numerous services had been combined over the years. Thus reform completed the 
process and specifically merged the governance structure.
61
   In Regina, the health district 
structure arrived in April/May 1992,
62
 though the Regina Health District (RHD) did not 
formally establish until 1993.
63
  The Regina board had already combined a number of 
services; reform simply completed the process.
 64
  In June 1992, Prince Albert established an 
interim Prince Albert Health Board.
65
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One of the government‟s important contributions to these efforts was to encourage 
pre-emptive consultations with health stakeholders, health unions and the community. 
Consultations aimed to ease fears and frame reform as collaborative.
66
 In addition, the 
government encouraged the local leaders to minimize the impact of the amalgamations on 
stakeholders.   Simply, the government did not want stakeholder confrontations early before 
reform even began.  As a result, prior to merging the SHSA engaged in extensive discussions 
with its unions and the community.  In addition, the SHSA publicly committed early on to 
minimizing cuts by targeting administrative efficiencies and only making cuts to direct care 
as a last resort. Doing so eased possible tension with the unions and community.
67
    
While none of these boards formed under the Wellness model, and it is difficult to 
determine what role the government played in their decisions to amalgamate, each ultimately 
became an early example of Wellness‟ objectives.  Hence, the work and then success of these 
boards proved important. Simard recognized and spoke of their efforts, noting their 
leadership in the creation of an improved and efficient health system.   
Undoubtedly, underlying and conditioning these early reform efforts were discussions 
on the dire provincial finances.  While the government had, and continued to forewarn people 
about the province‟s poor finances, the reality hit in the May 1992 provincial budget.  That 
budget sent an ominous signal to the health system that the government was serious about 
stringently managing health expenditures.  Budget day brought cuts of $344 million across 
government and 500 jobs.
68
  Health‟s budget was reduced by 3.51 percent, cutting 
expenditures by $59.7 million from $1.587 billion to $1.541 billion.
69
  Cuts included:  a 
sizeable reduction to the drug plan; new fees for a number of health services; a five percent 
reduction in physician fees; and a 2.3 percent cut in hospital funding.
70
  Cuts to hospitals 
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equated to a decrease of $26 million.  Some of the hospital funding was shifted to 
preventative and home based care.
71
  In addition, hospitals were put on notice of a further 3.2 
percent cut in 1993/94.
72
  Even the new Saskatoon district faced a three percent or $6 million 
cut, which became almost $12 million with inflation and other increases considered.
73
  A 
similar sized reduction was a reality for that districts 1993/94 budget. These were harsh 
announcements for Saskatchewan‟s health system.  Health care would not be protected.  It 
had to share in the restraint needed to bring fiscal health back to Saskatchewan.  
Adams, Simard and Health Department officials resumed their efforts begun earlier in 
the year. They crisscrossed the province meeting with local communities, union leaders and 
the media selling the message about fiscal restraint and health system restructuring.  People 
might support reform, the government believed, if they understood the problem.   More 
importantly, the government worked to ensure people understood that the fiscal crisis was a 
reality underpinning health reform. Basically, these efforts prepared communities for the 
realities of reform. By summer‟s end, thousands of people had participated in these meetings.   
The government‟s public engagement efforts culminated on August 17, 1992 with the 
release of A Saskatchewan Vision for Health: A Framework for Change – or Wellness.74  
Though many expected that A Saskatchewan Vision for Health should offer a definitive 
direction and plan for Saskatchewan‟s health reform, it was restricted to a “….conceptual 
framework for major reform and revitalization of the Saskatchewan Health system.”75  The 
document intended only to guide reform. As a result, many felt significant disappointment. 
They wanted the government to dictate the process. 
In this regard, the government was tactical. In offering only a vision and vague goals, 
A Saskatchewan Vision for Health avoided becoming a target.  Indeed, no one could disagree 
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with the vision of a better health system, or with having health promotion, education, 
prevention and wellness as central goals of Saskatchewan‟s health services.76  More 
importantly, the document stressed that the government did not want to shape health reform 
nor did it want to run health care.
77
  Reform was a community exercise. Strategically, this 
focused attention on public participation and ownership of the system‟s transformation, 
preempting potential early stakeholder resistance. 
Yet, the document also clearly signalled significant change.  Integration and 
coordination evolved from regionalization, rationalization, and restructuring. Community 
focused delivery meant local control and accountability.
78
  A better use of health resources 
meant new roles for health professionals, changed roles for physicians, and an emphasis on 
sustainability, qualitative measurement and cost containment.
79
  Communities were to form 
planning committees to perform needs-assessments and begin creating larger health districts. 
Physicians and the government were to identify potential alternative funding mechanisms.   
Together, these were the central components of Saskatchewan‟s health reform effort. Of 
course, the document also aligned reform with improving not only the fiscal wellbeing of the 
health system, but of the province as well.  
Thus, from the start A Saskatchewan Vision for Health set out to gain public and 
health stakeholder‟s buy-in while also appeasing their concerns.  Past attempts at imposing 
change on Saskatchewan‟s health system resulted in vociferous resistance.  Conversely, the 
Murray Commission evidenced that Saskatchewan‟s health stakeholders willingly engaged in 
discussions on changing the health system and could even be supportive if they believed the 
change was positive and they could be part of the process.  The government‟s plan 
succeeded. At the unveiling of the A Saskatchewan Vision for Health, representatives from 
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SUN, the College of Physician and Surgeons and the Regina Community Clinic, participated 
alongside Simard.  Others responded positively and with the same bluntness as Hewitt 
Helmsing, director of the Saskatchewan Health Care Association, who publicly stated that 
Wellness was long overdue.
80
 These stakeholders both supported and set out to participate in 
the reform process.  They seemingly did so because they believed in the opportunities offered 
by the nascent reform, and because they wanted to be involved in shaping reform. 
Wellness‟ design also tried to lessen the negative response from rural communities. 
Rural people were, since past reports and studies had recommended rural hospital closures, 
understandably suspicious of reform.  Thus, there was no surprise when alarm was raised. 
For example, the Mayor of Climax warned that “….if the government ever decided to close 
Climax Border Union Hospital…It would be a disaster for us….”81 Kyle Mayor Ansgar 
Tynning echoed the warning, noting that “These people need assurances a doctor will be 
there.”82  Fortunately for the government, an important rural ally appeared. The 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) indicated optimism over the 
changes and looked forward to working with the government to implement them.
83
 Hence, to 
the government‟s satisfaction, initial rural response to A Saskatchewan Vision for Health 
turned out to be positive, though cautious. 
With A Saskatchewan Vision for Health unveiled the government moved to another 
large communications process. Sizeable meetings occurred in August and October 1992, 
along with two major regional consultation tours, one in September 1992 and the other in 
December 1992.
84
 At each meeting the messages spoke of the value of reform and Wellness.  
Of course, the other primary message focused on how finances left the government no 
choice; that reform was about protecting Saskatchewan‟s health system. Notably, the 
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government also quickly rejected calls by the opposition for public hearings on health 
reform.
85
  It argued that since this was a community based process it wanted to engage 
people at the community by community level.
86
  Yet, a more appropriate explanation is that 
public hearings shifted control of the process away from the government, it reduced personal 
contact with communities and stakeholders, and it was very public process.  All were valid 
reasons for the government to avoid hearings. 
In rural areas, the government tried to sell them on the value of reform for their 
communities. Simply, reform provided them with better quality health care.  Though some 
services might leave their local town, these redirected resources supported additional 
services, programs, physicians and health professionals in larger, better equipped health 
centres in a nearby community.
87
 Moreover, under reform rural communities owned these 
health services. Thus they had an opportunity to shape key delivery decisions through their 
planning committees and their new (and soon to be elected) health boards.
88
  By getting 
involved local people could take advantage of Wellness‟ opportunities in their community.  
At the same time, the government also worked hard to dispel rural views that health reform 
was “...merely to cut costs,”89 and surreptitiously about closing rural hospitals.  This was a 
challenging paradox. In essence, reform would close or alter health services in a town, and it 
was clearly tied to affordability.  However, the government hoped the resulting system stood 
as a better alternative. Hence, even as rural people grasped the necessity and even the 
possibility, they remained leery.  Yet, they agreed to participate in the process since they felt 
assured by the government‟s commitment to community ownership, though, some for no 
other reason than to protect their communities.  They understood the inevitability of reform.  
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Likewise, the government focused on management of organized labour. As a result, 
from the start it was both attentive to labour‟s response and actively encouraged labour to be 
part of every aspect of Wellness.
90
   Fortunately for the government organized labour also 
wanted to be part of the process.
91
 As already noted, health workers readily supported a 
realignment of Saskatchewan‟s health system, frustrated by the system‟s inefficiencies and 
waste, which contributed to poor and misaligned care.
92
   As well, labour was supportive of a 
focus on prevention, population health and health promotion, irritated at having to care for 
preventable health problems.
93
 It had also been party to a plethora of shelved reports and 
commissions, such as the Murray Commission, which documented their concerns and the 
system‟s problems.  Wellness was an exciting alternative to existing paradigms.  
In addition, reform opened the door to fixing Saskatchewan‟s outdated health sector 
collective bargaining structure.  Littered with 25 collective agreements, 382 locals and 538 
bargaining units, and every work place subject to different rules, the structure was unwieldy 
and dysfunctional.
 94
 Management, the government and even unions were extremely 
frustrated.
95
 Past governments had avoided tackling the problems, even after various reports 
had recommended fixing Saskatchewan‟s unhealthy labour environment.96  Unions even 
turned to the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board (LRB), though that too ended in 
failure.
97
  All involved, and particularly the government, understood that because of intense 
union rivalries, power struggles and protectionism, finding a remedy would be difficult, 
while imposing one meant political suicide.
98
   Thus, health reform became an opportunity 
for both the government and its union stakeholders.    
Yet, labour also worried about health reform.  It held out potential for job losses, 
instability and even raiding by other unions.  They did not enter reform willingly but did so 
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because they understood they had no choice – the fiscal crisis was evident.  They also moved 
to reform because they believed that the government intended to consider and even protect 
union interest.  
The NDP government‟s solution was to involve labour in the process. Inviting labour 
ensured a collaborative rather than antagonistic reform process and more importantly, built 
on long standing NDP-labour relationships.  Hence, from the beginning, labour was invited 
onto local planning committees and conversely, planning committees were encouraged to 
consult with local union representatives.
99
 There was also an open door policy that allowed 
union leaders regular contact with the government.  Ultimately, these were important 
strategic steps in ensuring labour‟s commitment to Wellness.  
Unfortunately, Simard‟s community meeting schedule and administrative work load 
meant that she had little time to dedicate to organized labour groups.  In September Lorne 
Calvert was appointed Associate Minister of Health, an action heralded as an example of the 
government directing attention to labour‟s concerns.  Calvert was charged with the sole 
responsibility for overseeing the labour component of health reform.  One of his first actions 
was to execute the commitment in A Saskatchewan Vision for Health to a formalized labour 
engagement process.
100
   
In December the Labour Relations Review Committee (LRRC) was established,
101
  
and tasked with making recommendations for changes and new approaches to employee 
relations in the health sector.
102
  From December to March 1993, the LRRC met with 
bargaining units, newly formed health boards, Department of Health officials, 
Saskatchewan‟s labour community, and groups outside the province.103  Unfortunately, the 
LRRC did not achieve the desired results. Early on an impatient government undermined the 
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committee‟s and credibility work by forging ahead with the formation of a „common table‟ 
bargaining structure,
104
 and then, by introducing the Health Districts Act in the Legislative 
Assembly in March 1993.  In both instances, the LRRC‟s input was not solicited.105  Then 
the LRRC leadership divided, creating two reports and recommended directions to 
government.  Neither provided workable solutions. With the failure of the LRRC, one of the 
government‟s key efforts, establishing labour‟s leadership of the restructuring of health 
sector collective bargaining, failed.
106
  Indeed, the LRRC simply laid this responsibility at the 
feet of the government.
107
 Though the LRRC was a disappointment, it did provide important 
affirmation of labour‟s support for reform and of labour‟s willingness to attack collective 
bargaining issues.
108
    
During these early months, the government paid close attention to the views of SUN.  
As noted, Simard and SUN had already established friendly relations and this alliance was 
influential in setting Simard‟s approach to Wellness and in convincing Simard that reform 
was possible.  More importantly, SUN was a powerful, militant and outspoken union that 
held a great deal of credibility with the general public.  If SUN and nurses supported health 
reform, chances of reform‟s success were even greater. 
Understandably, SUN‟s approach to reform was pragmatic:  reform needed to reflect 
nurses‟ issues. 109 Over the years nurses had grown frustrated by a system that remained 
unchanged and unresponsive to patient needs and, equally, to nurses‟ needs.  For example, 
nurses wanted to work less hours, reduced workloads and increased wages.  Vacancies grew 
across the system, as did their workplace stress.
110
 In a more general sense, they sought more 
influence, increased career opportunities, widened responsibilities and new levels of 
autonomy and authority based on their central role in patient care.
111
  In addition, as nurses 
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grew frustrated by what they saw as a system failing to provide the best and most efficient 
care, they supported shifting to primary health care with its focus on public health, 
prevention, education, promotion, screening and monitoring,.
112
  Notably, SUN endorsed the 
Murray Commission‟s recommendations, and in particular, those that recommended changes 
to nursing services to reflect increased professional responsibilities and new 
circumstances.
113
 Likewise, Simard endorsed SUN‟s issues and solutions during her years in 
opposition.  As a result, nurses responded positively to reform, and in particular, to reform‟s 
attention to nurses‟ concerns.  Thus, the longer term benefits of reform were worth the short 
term pain. Already the 1992 provincial budget cut nurse‟s jobs and meant more work.114  
SUN responded by encouraging nurses to bear the pain. 
Simard‟s positive support for SUN‟s issues, alongside her longstanding relationship 
with SUN, was also critical. In fact, it was probably central in leading SUN to quickly ally 
with the government. This alliance provided them a means to both protect and advance 
nursing interests. The Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association (SRNA) applauded the 
relationship commenting that “Meetings between SRNA and SUN at the provincial level 
have been very exciting and encouraging… Continued discussions of this nature can only 
result in benefits for individual nurses ….”115    Ultimately, the close relations and insider‟s 
view aided in their belief that reform offered nurses many benefits. If these benefits 
disappeared, so too would their support.   
The close relationship with Simard likely also played a role in convincing SUN that 
the fiscal crisis was real and that the government intended to move forward with health 
reform regardless of SUN‟s views – the fiscal crisis ensured that.  Participating in the process 
brought more benefits than did resistance. 
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SUN also remained leery, though. Over the years past governments had failed to 
address nurses‟ needs, in their view, largely because each had catered to physicians.116 Thus 
SUN noted its support was conditioned on the government having the “…courage to go 
beyond cost cutting in acute care, and actually tackle the bloated fee-for-service system, that 
is the biggest obstacle to genuine reform….”117  In fact SUN stated it remained vigilant and 
ready to criticize the government if it saw otherwise.
118
 True to their word, through the early 
months of 1992, SUN pushed the government aggressively on nurses‟ issues.119    
Other explanations exist for SUN‟s early support for reform.  SUN‟s interest in 
reform likely also arose because of the government‟s intention to change Saskatchewan‟s 
health sector bargaining environment. As SUN, CUPE and SGEU represented nurses and 
engaged in an acrimonious rivalry over members and issues, SUN sought to be involved to 
not only ensure its interests were protected, but to possibly to gain members from other 
unions.  SUN also hoped for an improved bargaining environment. 
Furthermore, nurses were weary, still reeling from the acrimonious eleven day May 
1991 strike that had followed on the heels of a similarly difficult strike in 1988.  One SUN 
member noted, “I love nursing, but I can‟t tolerate the stress of striking every two 
years…there must be a better way.”120  These strikes caused a sizeable operating deficit for 
the union and created pressure for increased dues and internal fiscal restraint; neither was 
welcomed by members.
121
  SUN‟s leaders were also fatigued.  President Pat Stuart resigned 
in early 1992, citing the pressures of a number of difficult years at the helm.  An interim 
President was appointed to replace her.  SUN, too was exhausted by years of poor relations 
with the Conservative government.  Thus, the union looked forward to working collegially 
with an NDP government with whom it had a history of positive relations. It was a 
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collegiality that was reciprocated as SUN had easy access to the offices of the government 
and was part of almost every committee. 
The government considered physicians the other important stakeholder in the reform 
process.  Yet, an entirely different relationship existed between this stakeholder and the 
government. As already noted in the earlier chapter, their relationship in recent years had 
been respectful, yet an underlying tension existed.  Simply, physicians‟ remained ever fearful 
of attempts by the government to erode their position within Saskatchewan‟s health 
system.
122
 On the whole, these included attacks on physician autonomy, efforts to control 
physician‟s scope of work and attempts to implement alternative payment schemes.  For this 
reason, every government-physician discussion contained unspoken threats that physicians 
were willingness to resort to aggressive resistance. As a result, every previous Saskatchewan 
government stepped back from these policy directions.   
Yet, reform undeniably intended to address physician-related issues.
123
 The 
government had no option. Physicians were a major cost driver in Saskatchewan‟s health 
system and they historically stood in the way of meaningful system transformations.  A 
Saskatchewan Vision for Health unmistakably identified the reshaping of physicians‟ roles in 
the health system. Moreover, Simard acknowledged that her far reaching health reform 
agenda was achievable only if physicians participated.
124
 Thus, as reform of physician 
services was essential to the government‟s plans, management of physicians was a key 
priority. Moreover, for the sake of other stakeholders, physicians could not escape the pain. 
There were two reasons why the government was confident that Saskatchewan‟s 
physicians could be convinced to participate in Wellness.  In spite of physicians‟ credibility, 
the government made it clear that the province‟s fiscal crisis meant that a refusal to join in 
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restraint exposed physicians and their Association, the SMA, to public criticism. In 
particular, physicians could expect the criticism to focus on the costs of their fee-for-service 
remuneration.  Additionally, the government believed that physician concerns could be eased 
if they, and the SMA, were invited to participate in health reform and to understand its 
benefits.
125
  
The government thus initiated a collaborative engagement process.
126
 It was a process 
that began in early 1992, and before the unveiling of Wellness.
127
   Early meetings with the 
SMA apprised them of reform‟s intent and directions and the discussions honed in on the 
benefits of reform for physicians, such as the removal of barriers to patient care and opening 
up of new practice opportunities.
128
  Participation on community planning committees and 
other working groups was also encouraged.  An important message and early compromise 
occurred when the government assured the SMA that, although alternative payment schemes 
were being explored, it would not force physicians to join.
129
 Interestingly, this contrasted 
with the fact that Department staff had been assigned to study, develop and implement 
policies for moving physicians to alternative payment methods.
130
   Clearly, the government 
was prepared to maintain peace with physicians while furtively moving a physician reform 
agenda forward. 
As a result, physicians offered cautious support for reform.
131
 The College of 
Physicians and Surgeons suggested that it believed there was value in Wellness.
132
  Reform 
could improve health services to patients, it could offer healthier environments for 
physicians, and it could bring more physicians into rural Saskatchewan.  More importantly, 
reorganization and regionalization gave no hints that physicians traditional methods and 
practices would change, or rather, that the government intended to impose unwelcome 
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change upon physicians.  Nonetheless, some individual physicians held mixed views on 
Wellness fearful of potential attacks on their remuneration and autonomy, of hospital 
closures in their communities, of reduced funding, and of increased workloads.   
More importantly, physicians also understood the gravity of the fiscal crisis.  Not 
only had the 1992/93 budget cut health expenditures, it cut funding for physician 
remuneration. In making these cuts, the government proclaimed that over the previous four 
years physician fees had increased by 3.4 percent annually despite a drop in Saskatchewan‟s 
population.
133
   Indeed, the government‟s announcement on the matter noted that “…one 
major key to controlling cost growth in health care is achieving controlling of open-ended 
programs like physician services….”134 For physicians, the message was clear.  Interestingly, 
however, the service agreement signed in November implemented only a 2.4 percent 
reduction, though it did insert cost control mechanisms that included a restriction on service 
coverage, restrictions on the number of non-resident physicians and a soft capping 
mechanism that penalized physicians who encouraged excess utilization of their services.
 135
  
The agreement also committed both sides to the development of a longer-term physician 
resource strategy.
136
 While the government promoted the agreement as incenting physicians 
away from fee-for-service and onto alternative remuneration methods, and controlling costs, 
it once again demonstrated the government’s unwillingness to strong-arm its physicians.   
Even SUN observed that the agreement did not going far enough to contain physicians‟ 
costs.
137
  More importantly, SUN believed it failed to move physicians away from fee-for-
service remuneration.
138
  Interestingly, the SMA commented that the poor financial state of 
the province significantly influenced their discussions to support the agreement.
139
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By December 1992, the government found it had weathered the first few months of 
reform successfully. The media responded positively to the A Saskatchewan Vision for 
Health.  The messaging around reform achieved its goals as a poll that month found 72 
percent of the respondents supporting the conversion of small rural hospitals to other health 
care uses,
140
  and, 50.6 percent agreeing that the government should emphasize preventative 
care even if it meant cutting hospitals to achieve this goal.
141
   
Thus, by the end of 1992, the government‟s first steps towards health reform proved 
fruitful. A Saskatchewan Vision for Health received initial cautious support from all of its 
stakeholders.
142
  Physicians expressed limited concern, while other health workers, and 
especially SUN, were generally supportive.
143
 Simard‟s extensive travels across the province 
promoting Wellness and encouraging public and stakeholder involvement earned the support 
of people in rural Saskatchewan. Though fearful of hospital closures and other negative 
ramifications, they remained willing to participate.  Thirty-five community planning 
committees – the number Simard recommended - analyzed local health needs and drew the 
new boundaries for their district; a task which was to be completed by August 17, 1993. 
Hospital administrators, home care staff, public health nurses, physicians and local people 
actively participated in the processes.  
While stakeholders, for the most part, supported reform, the government also 
acknowledged that each came to the process, not because they fully endorsed reform, but 
rather because a fiscal crisis marshalled them along. Moreover, each had as a key objective 
the protection of their constituents. The government‟s communications and messages 
successfully convinced stakeholders of the value of reform in that regard, while reinforcing 
the underlying fiscal imperative. Thus the public and the media were on side, and as a result 
Chapter 2: The Beginning: Implementing Health Reform (1991 & 1992) 
 
54 
stakeholders were on board.  The government‟s health reform agenda had taken hold and for 
the most part, in its first year, could be labelled an initial success.   
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Chapter 3: The Middle of Health Reform: Bearing through the Pain 
1993 and 1994 were pivotal years for reform. Over the course of these two years, 
reform moved from the nebulous state of A Vision for Health Care, into a concrete reality.  
Not only did the actualization of reform begin – rationalization and reorganization – but a 
tough 1993 provincial budget and deficit/debt reduction plan implemented immediate cuts, 
closed rural hospitals, and imposed longer term health spending restraint. Never before had 
Saskatchewan‟s health sector experienced such large cuts and extensive change.  As 
expected, the significant outpouring of stakeholders anguish and anger filled newspapers and 
airwaves, and spilled over into coffee rows across the province.   
Only the fiscal crisis held both stakeholders and the government alike to this tough 
reform agenda.  Yet, more was required to end outright conflict.  Hence, the management of 
health stakeholders became a central concern for the government. It turned to a number of 
different tactics, such as creating committees, entering into discussions and educating 
stakeholders, to pacify and persuade. Importantly, the government also turned to small 
monetary and non monetary concessions when these tactics failed.  While this enabled 
reform to stay on track, it also began the grinding down of reform.  Simply, the pattern was 
set. As the “pain” of health reform hurt stakeholders‟ members, they in turn became critical 
of reform, the press coverage worsened and the public grew concerned. The cycle began 
anew.  Hence, though these concessions slowed stakeholder criticisms and resistance, they 
ultimately became its failure. Thus 1993 and 1994 is the story of how the government tried to 
pursue A Vision for Health Care in the face of vast stakeholder resistance. It discusses why 
that resistance led the government to choose one tactic over another, and more importantly, 
to use concessions, in due course began the slow unwinding Wellness.  
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 The framework for 1993 was set by Janice MacKinnon, the new Minister of Finance, 
who signaled alarm over the state of Saskatchewan‟s finances.  A deep recession settled upon 
Canada,
1
 hitting Saskatchewan particularly hard.
2
  National and provincial unemployment 
levels were significant.
3
  No relief was anticipated for 1993.  Even more problematic, the 
provincial government missed its 1992 budget target, increasing total debt to $14.7 billion; 
the worst per capita in Canada.
4
  Cuts to federal transfers for health and education added to 
the province‟s woes.  Even with projected economic growth in 1993, Saskatchewan 
anticipated an increasing budget deficit and debt.
5
  Credit rating agencies began to signal 
their intention to lower the province‟s credit rating; one major agency even characterized 
Saskatchewan‟s fiscal state as a crisis.6  The province teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. 
The government had to act.
7
  
While fiscal issues pressured the government, local health planning committees also 
began to feel pressure. In January they received the Health Needs Assessment Guide for 
Saskatchewan Health Districts.
8
   It detailed the proposed formulaic needs-based approach to 
be used in crafting the new services and programs for future health districts.
9
  While sensible, 
this new approach differed vastly from the previous system.
10
  Responsibility for identifying 
and developing health programs and services for local communities shifted from Regina 
bureaucrats to district planning committees.
11
  These committees now carried a huge burden.  
New programs identified as meeting the health needs of the community, replaced existing, 
even long standing low-value ones.
12
  Moreover, these services and programs were typically 
relocated to a larger centre in the district in order to take advantage of economies of scale.  
At the same time, the province‟s fiscal state meant planning committees also had less funding 
to work with.    
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Rural communities, more so than urban, faced change. Within a rural district, some 
towns gained, while others, typically the smaller, lost.  While this meant many longstanding 
health programs and services ended, it also ended the accompanying jobs that provided 
employment to small town Saskatchewan. In essence, many saw reform as killing rural 
towns.
13
  Madonna Unterreiner, the Chief Executive Officer and Director of nursing at 
Bengough hospital noted as much when she said that needs assessments was “….designed to 
start squeezing the fiscal life out of rural hospitals…."14  
While annoyed, outright resistance to these changes was muted by MacKinnon‟s 
March 18, 1993 budget which centred the government‟s agenda on fiscal management.15   
Importantly, the budget‟s Balancing the Budget -- The Fiscal Plan included a target of 
balancing the provincial budget by 1996/97.
16
  The plan aggressively reduced spending 
across government – public sector jobs, programs and services were rationalized or cut17 – 
and taxes were increased.  Overall government operating expenditures dropped 3.4 percent 
for the year.
18
 Cuts were also announced for the 1994/95 fiscal year.
19
  
Health care spending fell too, with an overall reduction of 3.0 percent.
 20
  Cuts hit 
three areas of spending. The children‟s publicly funded dental plan was eliminated. The 
prescription drug plan was redesigned.  Hospital budgets were reduced by 3.0 percent for 
1993/94,
21
 with $18.5 million cut from hospital operations and $2.5 million from special care 
homes.
22
 Health capital also fell $7 million.
23
   
Budget day Simard also announced the new Health Institution Strategy.  The 
strategy‟s goals were straightforward: 
 A shifting of resources from institutions to community-based services such as 
home care; 
 A reduction of approximately one third in the number of acute care beds and a 
redistribution by location and function; 
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 A targeted reduction in the number of long term care beds and the phasing out 
of funding for “light care”; and  
 The conversion of hospitals to community-based care facilities without acute care.24 
 
In essence, the government reduced its support for acute care services via targeted reductions 
in funding – rural hospitals at 5.5 percent, base hospitals at 3 percent and regional hospitals at 
2 percent
25
 – and by mandating a lower level of total number of acute care beds.  A further 
reduction of 2.8 percent to acute care funding was identified for 1994/95.
26
  
The implication of these decisions was clear. There would be program cuts and beds 
closed across Saskatchewan.  Indeed, in making the announcement Simard noted that three 
facilities bore the brunt of the cuts:  Melfort, Swift Current and Weyburn.
 27
  Within weeks 
the Weyburn Regional Health Centre, cut 10 percent or 50 of its 500 jobs,
28
 with the others 
following soon after.   
From that moment on, Wellness became less about improved health care and more 
about funding cuts, especially to health facilities and services in rural Saskatchewan.  A few 
weeks earlier the introduction of the Health Districts Act garnered little criticism from 
stakeholders, likely since the act was administrative in nature.  It defined the framework for 
health district boards, the responsibilities of each board and the election process.
29
 However, 
following the budget and health cuts, the debate on the Health District Act provided a forum 
for attack on health reform, and in particular, cuts.  Not only did rural communities provide 
the opposition with stories about lost beds and jobs, numerous rural towns and communities 
signed opposition petitions asking for funding to be restored. As a result, the Legislature 
resounded with heated and emotional exchanges, almost all of which were covered by an 
attentive media. Understandably, public interest swelled, especially as the opposition 
clamored to defend rural Saskatchewan. The opposition raised the specter that rural towns, 
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not urban centres, had been handed an unfair share of the cuts,
30
 and that these hospital and 
bed closures meant the end of rural life.
31
   
Moreover, rural communities also acted.  Politicians received irate letters.
32
  People 
complained in the media.  Public meetings also began across the province.  Over 300 people 
attended a March 29
th
 rally in Prince Albert organized by the newly formed Concerned 
Citizens for Health Care;
33
 in late March 500 people attended a meeting in Leader;
34
 on April 
1
st
 another 500 people gathered at a meeting in Eatonia;
35
 and almost a week later 500 met 
Simard in Weyburn.
36
  In Melfort 35 people stormed the annual NDP meeting of the Minister 
of Community Services.
37
  In a matter of weeks, hundreds of people attended numerous 
meetings protesting reform‟s cuts.  Even more meetings were scheduled.38 In essence, rural 
communities across Saskatchewan were not about to accept these cuts and changes.    
While the government felt concern over rural Saskatchewan‟s response to reform, it 
was even more worried by labours‟.  SEIU SGEU and CUPE joined some of these protests 
and rallies. CUPE even designed a button that said, „Without Workers Wellness Won‟t 
Work‟.  Their workers attacked the government stating “…we‟re not losing our jobs – we‟re 
losing our professions…39    These unions represented the concerns of those employees 
facing layoffs and worried about finding new work.
40
   
On April 6, 1993 the government had enough of the oppositions delaying tactics, and 
introduced closure.  Appreciating the potential for a negative reaction to closure, Simard‟s 
speech that day tried to defend reform‟s cuts as imperative – the outcome of a fiscal crisis – 
and closure as stopping the boondoggling of an opposition who firstly created the fiscal and 
health system problems, and now attempted to prevent the work of community planning 
committees who supported reform and who worked hard to make it happen.
41
  Nonetheless, 
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closure simply ignited another vigorous opposition response, and unfortunately, even more 
negative media coverage.
42
   
The closure motion, ostensibly, arose in direct response to the escalating emotional 
debate in the Legislature and media. And, though in and of itself, it resulted in more debate, 
the public attack on reform had to end. Continued debate increased the potential that the 
wave of protests could expand.  Yet, the government also legitimately needed to expedite the 
reform process. Significant support existed across the province and amongst health 
stakeholders. Even as unions and organizations, like the Saskatchewan Public Health 
Association, raised concerns about reform,
 43
  they continued to publicly endorse Wellness‟ 
goals and principles.  Many communities were moving forward in their work.  Moreover, 
polling confirmed that the public supported health reform.  During the worst of the public 
rallies, a government poll showed that 52 percent of the population supported establishing 
health districts,
44
  and support for reducing hospital beds hovered around 53 percent.
45
  These 
results mirrored those of a December 1992 poll.  Both polls confirmed for the government 
that the majority of the public agreed with health reform and solidified the government‟s 
commitment to pursuing reform despite the protests.  
Furthermore, planning committees who were ready to form their health district and 
health board required a legislative framework.  Thus the Health District Act legislation 
needed to be passed. Delays only contributed to instability.  While a mixture of approaches 
had already been used
46
 – the Crown Corporations Act the Non-Profit Corporations Act –
some pressed the government.  For example, the Saskatchewan Health Care Association 
(SHCA) stated that “Many areas are ready to form their district and it's essential that the right 
legal framework be in place to enable them to do so.”47  The government could not allow the 
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process to be bogged down in bureaucracy, which in turn might erode the support of these 
planning committees. Ironically, even the opposition condemned the government for not 
having passed the legislation, noting that this caused problematic delays for boards.
48
    
Unfortunately, the government‟s reform agenda was severely altered on April 14, 
1993 when reform took on a new dimension. On that day – later known as “Black 
Wednesday”49 – the government closed or converted 40 percent of the province‟s 132 
hospitals and integrated care facilities.  Over half (28) were to be completed by October 1993 
and the rest (24) by early 1994.  The same day, Regina‟s Health Board announced the closure 
of the Plains Health Centre.
50
    
Although the government emphasized that the decision to close hospitals was 
motivated by “…the fiscal crisis that faces our province,”51 other reasons existed. A key 
reason was that the budget a month earlier clearly signaled the inevitability of hospital 
closures. The government, therefore, simply took responsibility for a difficult decision, 
relieving health boards of a task that could entangle them in antagonism and impede their 
future relations with community members and health stakeholders.
 52
  One board member 
noted as much suggesting his board “…wanted the government to close hospital beds 
because there was fear that no one would run for the district board if bed closure decisions 
were made locally.”53  Moreover, closing all the hospitals at once coordinated the 
rationalization process and sped up reform.
54
  Thus, the pain from waiting for each individual 
health board to finish their planning process was avoided.  
In addition, this approach placed the government in front of reform‟s message.  
Twenty-three integrated facilities did not close, but instead received funding for long-term 
care operations.  They also received an additional $42,500 per bed to help find alternatives to 
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acute care delivery, such as, the creation of a wellness centre to house emergency acute care 
and other health care programming.
55
 This message was important, and one that the 
government needed to highlight:  closure of a hospital did not mean the end of health care in 
a community.
56
  Unfortunately it was a message soon drowned out. 
The government also felt confident in its policy direction.  On the whole, closing 
hospitals was not without support.  A reporter noted, “…the NDP only did what is necessary 
and something that should have been started much earlier…now will be the time to pioneer a 
new, leaner system that reflects today's changing financial conditions….”57  Even some rural 
newspapers, like the Fort Qu‟Appelle Times, promoted the value of closures: 
. . . while one cannot underestimate the economic blow the hospital closures 
meant to these communities, neither can one deny the fact that the Romanow 
government's complete restructuring of the province's health care system was 
necessary.  This province can no longer afford to keep hundreds of hospital 
beds open across the province when only a very small percentage of them were 
in use at any one time. The millions of dollars that were being spent on these 
facilities can obviously be used more effectively and wisely in other areas of 
our health care system.
58
 
 
Likewise, other supporters included the Saskatchewan Association of Special Care Homes, 
the Prince Albert Health Board, and the Saskatchewan Registered Nurses' Association.
59
  
Quietly, SUN too supported this action.  Even the College of Physicians and Surgeons wrote 
in a letter to Simard that   “We do our rural citizens a grave disservice if we continue to 
support and foster the idea that maintenance of a hospital in their community is the only basis 
for assuring high-quality accessible health care. That is…frankly, dishonest.”60   
Nonetheless, affected rural communities and people opposed to reform reacted 
negatively.  They complained in the media, or contacted their MLA or the Minister of Health.  
Simard and Calvert received an extraordinary amount of mail, reaching 250 to 300 pieces in 
the months following.
61
  Rallies began anew across the province.
62
  A public rally at the 
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Legislature on April 21, 1993 brought out 800 angry protestors.  During that rally protestors 
carried placards proclaiming: "The New Death Plan: Rural Hospitals; Not Coffins" or "Rural 
bumpkins need acute-care beds, too!" and "Wellness is killing rural Saskatchewan."
63
  The 
crowd booed Simard when she came out of the Legislature to speak to them.
64
 Rural people 
were so angry that in one instance NDP MLA Glen McPherson needed an RCMP escort out 
of a community he was visiting.
65
  
The message was clear: rural people felt deceived.  Reform came to represent betrayal 
and duplicity by the government. Rural communities had been told that reform was not about 
closures, yet it was.  Moreover, closing hospitals had undermined the government‟s promise 
of letting community‟s shape their health reform.66  Communities also linked hospital 
closures and health reform to the fiscal crisis; reform was about saving money, not improving 
health care.  At its worst, reform became characterized as “…hellness and wealth 
reform….”67   Reform also converged with other government imposed actions: school 
closures and the cancelling of the popular agriculture support program, GRIP (Gross 
Revenue Insurance Plan).  Hence, health reform became part of “Romanow‟s Rural 
Revenge.”68 
The government countered with a simple strategy.  Cabinet Ministers and department 
officials travelled rural Saskatchewan attending many intense and emotional community 
meetings.
69
  Even the Premier faced angry crowds.
70
  Through it all government members 
took responsibility for and defended their decision.
71
  The message was direct:  health reform 
offered better and efficient health care, and the province‟s finances made reform an 
imperative.  
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Understandably, the government grew concerned with the number of rallies, the level 
of anger and the potential for both to erode the support for reform by the general population 
and health stakeholders.  In response, the Rural Health Advisory Committee (RHAC) was 
created in May.
72
   It was to identify health care issues in rural communities and assist the 
government find solutions by making suggestions to ease the transition process in rural 
Saskatchewan.
73
  With the committee in place, the government hoped many of the rural 
issues could be resolved, or at least mitigated.  
Similarly, the government looked to alleviate labours‟ unease with reform‟s changes.  
While rural communities carried some influence on the fate of reform, the government 
simply could not keep reform afloat if it lost labour‟s support at the same time as rural 
Saskatchewan grew angrier.  In particular, a red flag emerged in March when SUN and 
CUPE presented a brief to the Minister of Health.  It highlighted concerns with Wellness.  
The brief noted that reform was moving too quickly and lacked adequate planning. As well, 
it reiterated demands for the transformative shift of Saskatchewan‟s health system promised 
in A Vision for Health Care.
74
   
The government responded to what they viewed as the more important of these 
concerns by creating the Health Reform Labour Transition Coordinating Committee 
(HRLTCC) in April.  The HRLTCC became the government‟s proactive strategy for 
addressing worker displacement and easing labour concerns over reform.  The committee 
brought together health sector unions (SUN, SEIU, HSAS, CUPE and SGEU), employer 
representative groups, representatives of the newly created district boards, and other non-
organized groups within the health care system to examine “…strategies for minimizing the 
impact of health reform initiatives and budget cuts on health sector employees.”75 Sub 
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committees were also used to consider matters like transfer agreements and employee career 
adjustment support to assist with transitioning to new opportunities in the reformed health 
system.
76
  Health boards and district planning groups were asked to support the work of the 
HRLTCC by proactively identifying the number of people affected by layoffs and working to 
channel these people to other areas.
77
 As a result of its work, the HRLTCC created two new 
programs: a two year Health Reform Transition Program (HRTP) to assist health care 
workers affected by health system changes,
78
  and the Career Adjustment Assistance 
Program (CAAP), to mitigate the impact of health reform on employees by assisting with 
career transition including job postings services, financial support for training, and 
relocation.  A joint union-management committee oversaw the CAAP and government 
provided $3.4 million or up to $5,000 per employee for redeployment and severance.
79
 These 
programs were initially effective in easing labour concerns over health reform.   
More importantly, the government adopted a committee resolution process for labour 
stakeholders as it had with rural communities.   However, in the case of labour, the 
government anted up funds to facilitate the work, and thus keep labour on side. While small 
in size, these funds highlighted to all that money could be found to ease stakeholder pain. 
At the same time, the government also pressed forward with reshaping the health 
sector collective bargaining structure.  In part due to the urging of the government, SUN, 
SEIU, CUPE and SGEU came together under the Council of Health Unions in 1993 to work 
on jurisdictional issues, employee mobility, transition issues and bargaining structures.
80
  
Though they willingly worked together on a number of these issues, they reached an impasse 
on the restructuring of Saskatchewan`s health sector bargaining.  Competing interests could 
not be set aside.  The government, though disappointed by this failure, resisted forcing a 
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solution upon health unions.  In the early 1990s, the previous Conservative government‟s 
effort in this regard, resulted in a negative and vociferous labour response, and thus a quick 
retreat.
81
  This government did not intend to ruin its relations with health care unions over 
this matter, or more importantly, to create a reason for labour to unite against health reform.  
Instead, it opted to take a patient approach by letting labour find its own solutions.  This also 
meant collective bargaining reform, an important component of reform, remained on the back 
burner.  
On the employer side, the government initiated discussions on the merger of the three 
health care employer associations - the Saskatchewan Health Care Association (SHA) 
responsible for collective bargaining in the hospital sector, the Saskatchewan Association of 
Special Care Homes (SASCH) responsible for collective bargaining in the special care 
homes, and the Saskatchewan Home Care Association (SHCA) responsible for collective 
bargaining in the home care sector.
82
  By July 1, 1993, an agreement was achieved and the 
three merged, forming the Saskatchewan Association of Health Organizations (SAHO), and 
creating a single employer voice in the province. The merger was a step towards increasing 
efficiency within the health system and resolving long- standing employer related problems 
within Saskatchewan‟s labour environment.  A single employer ensured a coordinated voice 
at the bargaining table.  Moreover, this approach harmonized the employer`s responses to 
workplace problems created by health reform.
83
 
Interestingly, the government was strategic in its approach to working with individual 
health stakeholders.  As noted already, SUN garnered the most attention. Through 1993, the 
government acknowledged that SUN members bore the brunt of many of the changes.  
Indeed, some initial job loss estimates suggested that as many as 700 nursing jobs 
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disappeared due to hospital closures and conversions. The government scaled up efforts to 
maintain regular contact and dialogue with the union.  These sessions enabled SUN to raise 
issues about reform behind closed doors.
84
 SUN was also invited to participate in district 
planning committees, and health district boards, all ensuring nurses had input into decision-
making.
85
 While SUN suggested that this input served to secure employment for their 
members and to ensure reform delivered Saskatchewan people a reasonable health care 
system, the sessions also allowed the government to keep close watch on issues.
86
   
Of all the unions, SUN remained the most supportive of reform throughout the tough 
year.  It was confident that in spite of layoffs, there were still jobs for nurses.  After all, the 
need for nurses still existed, especially as community-based services created jobs to replace 
those lost in the institutional sector.
87
  Indeed, in the Saskatoon Health District “…most of 
the people who were laid off as a result of funding reductions last year were hired back into 
the system ….”88  A more concrete sign of successful reemployment was SUN‟s dues 
revenue which grew in spite of layoffs.  SUN also used the HRLTCC to gain job security 
provisions and transition support.
89
  
At the same time, SUN called for the government to honour its commitment to „real‟ 
health system reform. It believed health reform offered its members significant benefits. 
Hence, it was no surprise when SUN‟s president rallied nurses in early 1993 stating, “Despite 
flaws in the process used by government…nurses must remain committed to health-care 
reform.”90 And similarly, “Despite the tremendous challenges facing nurses and their 
union…this phase of health reform was a window of opportunity for nurses to directly 
influence the shape of the future health care system….”91  So long as reform held out 
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promises of meaningful change, nurses committed to reform‟s difficult path.92 That said, 
SUN also reminded the government its support was conditional on those benefits. 
As with nurses, the government dedicated significant effort to maintaining positive 
relations with the province‟s physicians through 1993.  While hard to verify, a deliberate 
government strategy seemed to be to minimize reform‟s early impact upon physicians.  This 
early reorganization and the hospital closures did not change physicians‟ work. The 
government also went out of its way to involve them in substantive decisions on physician-
related issues and to work with them on shaping reform. Physicians‟ too received invitations 
to join local planning discussions and committees. The government also strove to develop 
cordial relations. Not only did this ease resistance, but physicians‟ even traveled across 
Saskatchewan with the government promoting Wellness.
93
  Though these efforts proved 
successful, they also enabled the government to keep tabs on this group. Nonetheless, 
physicians still maintained at a high level of vigilance.  
Importantly, the government‟s efforts were particularly strategic. Reform included a 
number of significant changes for physicians, key of which was remuneration and shifting 
oversight for physicians to districts. During the year, discussions focused on a central 
platform of Wellness: alternative remuneration.
94
  The discussions, however, were short-
lived.  After a number of meetings and laborious exchanges, the SMA and physicians‟ 
refused to shift away from fee-for-service. The government backed away, indicating that 
voluntary participation was acceptable.  Clearly, keeping the larger health reform agenda on 
track took precedence over arousing resistance from a key stakeholder. This retreat also 
highlighted the government‟s willingness to move away from reform‟s more worthwhile, but 
difficult, objectives when confronted by significant stakeholder pushback. 
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On the whole, this proactive stakeholder management enabled the government to 
successfully navigate the early months of 1993.  It also should be recognized that a number 
of rural communities successfully transitioned to Wellness.
95
  Early on these communities 
understood the inevitability of reform.  One rural citizen stated “We feel fortunate that we 
have what we have….It‟s less than what we wanted, but we still have a doctor and we still 
have services.
96
   The Melville Advance commented, “…we should remember the changes 
are not made for the sake of making a change. Changes are necessary. They've been long 
talked about and are long overdue. But it's only…this government who've had the courage to 
do something about it.”97  Notably, these positive views of reform became important counters 
to the simmering anger of rural communities most affected by reform. 
By the fall, however, simmering discontent led affected rural communities to 
organize. The August deadline for the establishment of districts passed with individuals from 
Eston and Radville writing to all 52 communities affected by hospital closures calling for a 
meeting.
98
  In September forty met.  After day long discussions the Rural Health Coalition 
(RHC) was formed with a mandate to advocate on behalf of rural communities opposed to 
cuts to their health services.
99
  This became the first organized anti-health reform lobby.  
Almost immediately, the RHC began a very organized, aggressive and public 
campaign to raise rural concerns about the loss of health services in their communities.
100
  
While the RHC was not against health reform, it did debate local planning committee 
decisions to move services out of their communities to larger centres.
101
  It believed these 
decisions were based on a town's hockey team rather needs.
102
 The government remained 
unsympathetic.
103
  Simply, it was unwilling to interfere in decisions made by planning 
committees and boards.
104
  Moreover, the government understood that in offering 
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concessions or backing down, reform might quickly unravel.  It was not about to stop reform, 
though more importantly, it did not seem to consider the RHC, at this point, to be a credible 
stakeholder.  An angry RHC lobbied through the media and the opposition, even threatening 
to take the government to court, though, the government remained unmoved.  
While the government remained unwilling to bend to the RHC, it responded quickly 
to the SMA when in October 1993 physicians expressed anger over a government poll. The 
poll, which asked the public their views on physicians and various aspects of physician 
services, clearly was an effort by the government to test the waters on physician reform.
105
  
Notably, the poll overwhelmingly supported physician reform.
106
  An infuriated SMA 
publicly attacked the government calling the government‟s action an intentional effort to 
provoke public outcry to force physicians to alternative payment schemes.
107
  The outburst 
caused another proclamation from the government that it did not intend to force the issue. 
In November, the depth of the government‟s unwillingness to confront physicians 
emerged again during discussion on shifting responsibility for funding physicians to the 
health districts.  Physicians opposed this move since it meant their subjugation to health 
district management.  The government seemingly worried by this response, once more 
retreated from a major component of health reform.  Simard announced that the government 
aimed to administer a province-wide physicians‟ payment system.108  In essence, it created a 
parallel system and physicians were effectively excluded from complete integration into 
health districts. The centralization of physician bargaining disappointed proponents of 
Wellness.  It was contrary to the real intent and meaning of health reform and represented a 
major contradiction in Wellness, which was premised on the idea of local input and control.  
How could the health care system be locally controlled when health care salaries, which were 
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the largest single cost in the system, were controlled centrally? This ostensibly demonstrated 
the government‟s willingness to back away from the more strident aspect of reform when 
confronted with major criticism by one of the most powerful stakeholders. 
Similarly, the government appeared to back away from imposing a solution to rural-
urban physician distribution problems, a serious issue that exacerbated costs while doing 
little to increase rural access to health service.  Instead, of imposing distribution quotas, the 
Saskatchewan Medical Council, made up of a variety of system stakeholders, was formed to 
study the issue.
109
  A report from the committee was not completed until late October 1994.  
Understandably, in the fall of 1993 public unease with health reform increased in step 
with the eruption of stakeholder discontent. The media carried every report of hospital 
closures, protests, rebelling rural communities of the RHC, and eruptions from stakeholders.  
Hence, September‟s poll saw over 52.4 percent of respondents disagreeing with 
government‟s health reform direction.110  This sentiment worsened in October when over 57 
percent of Saskatchewan people stated they did not believe the government had done a good 
job reforming health care.
111
  Most felt services had deteriorated and identified health reform 
with hospital closures and program cuts.  A solid majority of 75.2 percent felt there had been 
too many cuts.
112
  The government was losing the public relations battle. Declining public 
support clearly concerned the government.   
Hurt by falling public confidence, concessions and retreats became the theme of 
1994.  As a result, a frustrated government, needing to end the months of RHC agitation, 
entered into discussions with them on a solution. An agreement arrived in February 1994.
113
  
The resolution saw the government retreat again, committing funding for minimal service 
levels in certain communities, helping to attract more physicians, and providing more money 
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for emergency services.
114
  A dispute process was also created to assist health boards and 
communities deal with any future changes to health services.
115
  The latter most likely was an 
attempt to insert a process between the RHC and the government.  Peace came at a cost of 
$1.1 million to be absorbed into the 1993/94 and 1994/95 provincial health budgets.
116
  The 
Conservative opposition nonetheless criticized the government, suggesting that these rural 
communities had to drag Simard “…kicking and screaming to the table under the threat of a 
lawsuit….”117   
Moreover, the government received a second shock in February when they lost a 
Regina by-election which saw health reform as a front and centre issue.  An NDP incumbent 
seat held by long time politician, John Solomon was lost to Liberal Anita Bergman, a former 
Regina Health Board member.
118
  The support for Bergman was significant. The loss sent a 
strong message that all was not well with health reform.
119
   
Improved finances meant that the government could offer some relief.  The February 
1994 Budget stated that the Balanced Budget Plan introduced in March 1993 was on track, 
provincial debt was decreasing and Saskatchewan‟s economy and job numbers had improved 
faster than the 1993 budget forecasts.
120
  Indeed, the 1994 provincial budget was filled with 
good news, though for the most part, these were targeted spending injections in reaction to a 
year of prolonged public objections over cuts in the 1993 budget.   
An evident response to the previous year‟s vociferous stakeholder outcry over health 
cuts was a $14 million budget increase for the Department of Health for 1994/5.  Home-
based community services received more money to speed up the transition to community 
care from acute care services.  Cuts to acute care, announced in the previous year‟s budget, 
were scaled back.
121
  This move eased, to some degree, fears of more job losses and bed 
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closures.
122
 Approximately $7 million was targeted, based on population, to helping districts 
to enhance emergency services, home-based palliative care, and disease and accident 
prevention.
123
  Another $3 million was used for province wide initiatives.
124
  Rural anxieties 
were also acknowledged.  A new $10 million Rural Initiatives Fund was unveiled, with much 
fanfare, to “…help ensure that rural health boards meet these locally determined needs….”125  
Importantly, this was not new money but consisted of funds reallocated mainly from acute 
care in order to quell problematic rural areas.  The astute leader of the third party, Linda 
Haverstock, condemned it as a pretense commenting that “…while the government is saying 
there will be a 1.6 per cent increase in health care funding, there will actually be a loss of $10 
million in acute care funding….”126  
Just as the government believed that the budget eased tensions amongst health 
stakeholders, health board elections became an issue.  Exact dates for board elections had not 
been included in the 1992 Wellness announcement, nor in the Health District Act.  Simard, 
though, had hinted at that time that elections should coincide with those of municipal 
governments, scheduled for October 1994.  Holding health board elections in conjunction 
with municipal elections reduced duplication and saved approximately $500,000 in 
additional election costs.
127
 Views, however, on the appropriateness of a fall district election 
date had shifted. At their January 1994 inaugural gathering, health board directors and CEOs 
supported a resolution asking the government to delay elections.
128
  Elections so soon after 
the formation of districts and closure of health facilities would create a process “…more 
disruptive than constructive.”129  Boards and CEOs felt that they were just becoming familiar 
with their responsibilities and much work remained before they would be ready.   
Chapter 3: The Middle of Health Reform: Bearing Through the Pain (1993 & 1994) 
 
76 
There were also other considerations.  The government, for instance, seemingly 
feared that elections could become a platform for angry communities and stakeholders.  
There were also concerns that these fledgling boards could become overrun with single-issue 
members.  The government also agreed that the appointed boards needed to finalize their 
work before taking on what could be a sizeable number of new inexperienced members.  In 
light of these issues, Simard announced that the government would take time to review the 
issue.
130
  
Simard‟s decision was not well received.  Affected rural communities, believing that 
elections provided a venue to air their grievances with health reform, or even to halt the 
process in their district, were angry.  Some unions saw elections as an opportunity to press 
their issues. CUPE, for example, argued that unelected“...boards are making decisions on a 
daily basis that affect workers in health care institutions and in communities they serve….”131 
The media too shared this view suggesting that a fall election made sense and avoided costly 
duplication.
132
  Likewise, the opposition publicly noted all of these concerns and used the 
issue to launch another vitriolic attack on the government.
133
   
After weeks of relentless pressure Simard appointed Garf Stevenson as a one-person 
commission to study district health board elections.
134
  As expected her decision was not well 
received.  Scathing criticisms were lobbed at the government.
135
  In the end, a major plank in 
the Wellness agenda, health board elections, became one more negatively charged public 
debate that the government needed to manage. 
Controversy over health board elections worsened the impact of the implementation of 
needs-based funding.  Essentially, beginning in April health districts received global funding 
as determined by the new needs-based funding formula.  District funding shifted from a 
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historic usage-based method to a formula that funded programs and services based on 
population and health needs.  On the whole, the impact of the funding shift was large, so 
much so that the government phased it in over a period of time to allow for adjustments at the 
community level.  Hence in 1994-95 approximately 60 percent of funding provided to health 
districts would fall under the needs funding formula.  The remaining 40 percent was 
scheduled to move in the next year.  Even with the phase-in, districts saw their funding fall, 
both in 1994 and in 1995. Cuts were imminent. 
The result was more criticism of the government and reform.  Both the opposition and 
rural people argued that the new funding formula offloaded difficult decisions onto local 
boards.
136
  The media carried stories of rural people‟s fears of having to travel great distances 
for care.  Sick and elderly family members faced relocation to facilitates somewhere in rural 
Saskatchewan.  Communities were being destroyed.
137
  Once again, the government faced 
searing criticism of its reform. 
Unfortunately, patience from key labour stakeholders was also diminishing.  The 
management of these large health districts was a challenge for new board members and 
inexperienced CEOs.  In many cases, they lacked the training and skills to manage human 
resources in these highly unionized environments. They had to deal with larger budgets, 
sizeable capital assets, and delivery of a wide-range of programs and services.  As a result, 
unionized and non unionized employees alike grew frustrated with the disorganized nature of 
health reform and the confusion in workplaces.  Their impatience was exacerbated by what 
seemed to be never ending fiscal restraint.  Complaints grew.   
SUN in particular was frustrated with reform.
138
  It noted that “Health reform so far 
has been characterized by layoffs and chaotic planning…,”139 and it believed that “…things 
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will get worse.”140  Difficulties with employee transfers among institutions within districts 
were not being resolved.  Recognition of rights and obligations covered by existing collective 
agreements were problematic.  Increased workloads were also an issue and SUN accused 
health boards, which faced limited funding, of not properly staffing some facilities.  In early 
1994, SUN took its concerns to the media over an issue of nursing staff levels, or lack 
thereof, in the Tisdale district.  The government, as usual, quickly responded with a SUN-
district commission to study and resolve the issues.  While the commission supported SUN‟s 
accusations, a few months later, SUN was back in the media complaining that the 
government and the district were ignoring the report‟s recommendations.141  Simply, the 
district did not have the money to fix the problem. 
These disputes gradually eroded SUN‟s support for health reform and added to 
nurses‟ discontent.  The government, sensing SUN‟s shifting sentiments, provided them with 
a $12.7 million in-scope salary settlement in the February budget.
142
  This was another 
attempt at a concession to keep a stakeholder on side.  The value was short-lived. By March 
concerns over health restraint erupted again. In Saskatoon the closure of the Saskatoon City 
Hospital Emergency particularly angered nurses.  The nurses collected over 2,000 signatures 
and organized a sizeable protest that garnered support of more than 100 doctors.
143
  The 
response overwhelmed the Saskatoon Board. It also caused unease in the government.   
By the 1994 SUN Annual Meeting, nurses‟ frustration was unmistakable.  They 
vocalized anger, irritation and concern over the impact on their jobs, their workplaces, and 
rural Saskatchewan of two years of health reform. They were unhappy. As a result, nurses 
directed their leadership to investigate affiliation with the Saskatchewan Federation of 
Labour (SFL).  This move sent a red flag to government.  
Chapter 3: The Middle of Health Reform: Bearing Through the Pain (1993 & 1994) 
 
79 
In essence, with every passing month, SUN grew more skeptical of the government‟s 
commitment to the benefits that reform offered to nurses. The government tried to engage 
SUN with more invitations to participate in government-stakeholder discussions and to sit on 
committees yet SUN was tired of these requests. Committees were not resolving issues. SUN 
merely grew leery of these invitations.  In effect, SUN‟s tolerance for reform was failing.  
Even so SUN continued to refrain from attacking health reform.  This tepid response 
did not go unnoticed.  In the closing months of 1994, the media commented that “…the NDP 
government can shut down rural hospitals and there is no sustained opposition from groups 
affected, such as the nurses union….”144  Simply, nurses retained some hope that Wellness 
may deliver its promised benefits to nurses.
145
 More likely, SUN did not have many options.   
Polling showed that the public support for reform had improved.  In the April-May 
1994 poll, health ranked 4
th
 on their list of priorities, and 67.6 percent of residents still ranked 
Saskatchewan health care as good or excellent.
 146
  Over 78 percent of people rated the 
government‟s health reform agenda as fair to excellent.147  By a large margin, hospital 
closures were the number one issue.
148
  A quick response by the government – the agreement 
with the RHC, a relatively good news budget, retreats that had quieted physicians, and salary 
increases for nurse – all contributed to a reduction in stakeholder complaints and thus, a shift 
in the public perception of health reform. Moreover, in continued tight fiscal times – one 
good news budget did not erase many years of fiscal crisis messaging – the government still 
had the upper hand; restraint needed to be shared even in the health sector. 
Undoubtedly, the government was also aided by a weakened opposition.  Burdened 
by the legacy of an abysmal record in government which included poor oversight of 
Saskatchewan‟s health care system, the Conservatives lacked credibility. The Liberal 
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opposition bereft of members in the Legislature were largely left out of the discussion on 
health care.  Moreover, in February the Liberal leader had stated her party‟s support for 
reform noting that it was inevitable and even necessary,
149
  though, she criticized the 
government for undertaking reform for the wrong reasons:  “They have changed health care 
because it was too expensive…”150  As a result, there was no political alternative.   
Furthermore, the government was also buoyed by the support of a large number of 
media members. This support came in spite of the emotive stories offered by the opposition 
and the complaints by, and at times, outright resistance to health reform by health 
stakeholders.  The media defended Romanow suggesting he had no choice, that 
“…modernizing health care to meet the province's fiscal and demographic reality was 
crucial… it was the right policy.”151 Thus, the NDP felt confident that health reform was on 
the right path. 
Besides, not all stakeholders were up in arms.  Through the early months of 1994, 
physicians remained on the sideline of reform.  They had won the day on key issues like their 
remuneration and having the government responsible for their fees payments. The 
government‟s apparent unwillingness to confront its physicians aided in quieting them.  This 
fact had not gone unobserved, caused one media outlet to comment in early 1994 that “…the 
Romanow government has carefully avoided one of the most critical issues.  There has been 
precious little if any, talk about what to do about doctors.  The people who have tremendous 
control over both supply and demand on the system have been mostly left out of the 
equation.” 152 
Yet, the physician‟s role within the reorganized structure was still, in spite of the 
government‟s public unwillingness to force physician reform, an important piece. As the 
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regionalization process progressed, discussions continued between the SMA and the 
government on physicians‟ integration into the new health districts structure.153  Moreover, 
the government was clear that its long term, “….vision included the integration of physician 
services with the district management of other health resources and programs….”154  The new 
health boards were to be responsible for physicians as part of their responsibility for the 
management of health district services and programs.
 155
   In fact, $2 million dollars was 
quietly set aside within the 1994 budget for initiatives
 
to facilitate the pace of this physician 
integration and to ease any tensions that might appear.
156
    
The summer however, gave way to more complaints from the RHC communities who 
turned to threats of a lawsuit, angrily proclaiming that “Bean counters have a bigger role 
setting policy than medical staff in the province‟s new approach to health care.”157 More 
importantly, in August, health boards and physicians publicly and aggressively, clashed. 
Having found their feet after almost a full year of operation, and importantly, facing 
tight budgets, health boards turned to exerting control over its largest cost driver; physicians.  
The problem first arose in the Saskatoon Health District where admitting privileges for new 
physicians to Saskatoon hospitals was restricted. A resolution on the matter was achieved 
when the district backed down, though physicians henceforth remained wary of the board.  
Yet, this was only the beginning. Problems escalated into the fall when physicians and health 
boards once again quarreled. Physicians decried the health districts‟ exertion of authority 
over physicians‟ scope of work and responsibilities,158 noting that “The authoritarianism and 
managerial inexperience in many rural districts was really causing the problem….”159  They 
felt districts did not consult. 
160
  Their complaints caught the government‟s attention when 
they began to suggest that unless relations changed, there was sure to be an exodus of doctors 
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from Saskatchewan.  Hence, with trouble brewing, the government brought the SMA and 
SAHO together to “…develop a framework agreement addressing key concerns.”161  The 
agenda included discussions on legal protection for physicians in their dealings with health 
districts, the establishment of a medical advisory committee in each district, remedies for 
working conditions and practice issues and an examination of alternative payment 
mechanisms.
162
  With a dialogue in place, tensions eased between the two parties.  However, 
by intervening, the government clearly signaled its willingness to side with its physicians.  
Again, the government believed it necessary to retreat in order to keep an overall vision of 
reform on track.  
By the end of the year, with health districts trying to exert control, the government 
pressing on the remuneration issue, and facing continued criticism from other health workers, 
physicians felt “…bashed and blamed….”163  At their November meeting, the SMA President 
decried these attacks. He noted physicians were not opposed to health reform, including 
hospital closures as a way to increase the efficiency of the system.  Nevertheless, in one of 
the first assertive proclaims from the SMA, he noted physicians “…had no meaningful input 
into health reform, they were losing their autonomy, had concerns about patient care and fear 
of uncertainty for their future.”164  Health reform essentially created more work for 
physicians while delivering worse patient care.
165
  If Wellness continued on this current path, 
he proclaimed“...the province could face the biggest threat to Medicare since the 1962 
crisis….”166 Yet, even with these strong comments, the SMA did not call for physicians to 
oppose reform. 
As the year ended, the polls clearly showed that the continued stakeholder outcry 
weakened public option.  An October 1994 poll identified that while the public still 
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supported the idea of health reform, 75.9 per cent of people felt that there had been too many 
budget cuts.
 167
  In spite of concessions and retreats, stakeholders were beginning to win the 
public relations battle.   
On the whole, during two difficult years of health reform, the government had 
successfully moved its agenda ahead, including spending constraint and hospital cuts, needs-
assessments and the creation of health districts.  Yet, in the face of stakeholder resistance to 
these changes, and thus declining public support for reform entirely, the government turned 
to concessions and spending to control and ease the pain of health changes. These retreats 
proved to be obvious signals to stakeholders and set in place a pattern whereby stakeholders 
slowly eroded away the difficult and, at the same time, more meaningful tenets of health 
reform.  More importantly once this pattern was embedded during 1994, reform`s unwinding 
appeared a certainty in light of a stabilized and improving fiscal environment, and with an 
election on the horizon. Thus, even as the government deserved credit for steering the health 
system through many difficult policy choices, relatively unscathed, the only question 
remaining, was how long until reform ended.   
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Chapter 4: The End of Health Reform: A Slow Unwinding  
 
While 1993 and 1994 were pivotal years for health reform, in 1995 and 1996 the 
government began, directly in response to problematic stakeholders, its full retreat from this 
policy direction. The government deemed concession to be a tactic necessary to ensuring 
reform remained on track. As a result, it provided a small spending injection in 1994 the 
provincial budget and advanced other smaller efforts over the course of the year.  Yet, while 
on the whole the compromises succeeded -- of stage one, only health board elections 
remained to be completed -- they also clearly signaled to stakeholders that pressure created 
compromise.  
Where holding stakeholders to small compromises proved feasible when a fiscal 
crisis backstopped these retreats, the changing provincial fiscal and economic environment 
meant a number of problems emerged on the reform horizon during 1995 and 1996. Of these, 
the province‟s fiscal recovery was the most significant, though the provincial election proved 
just as important.  The fiscal recovery begun in 1994 continued into 1995 and 1996, by which 
time, stakeholders understood its continuation was assured. Positive fiscal news effectively 
ended the government‟s vital reform anchor.  The provincial election also proved 
problematic.  Understandably, messaging around the fiscal turnaround and future economic 
prosperity, replaced those of a fiscal crisis, restraint and cuts.   
As a result, the dynamic stakeholder environment took control of reform.  Absent the 
fiscal crisis, and in light of the election messaging, their public outcries grew more 
vociferous and difficult to contain.  At the same time, improved finances made it easy for the 
government to continue to offer concessions to keep reform on track, though in the end, 
concessions simply led to more demands from stakeholders, who effectively juxtaposed the 
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province‟s fiscal recovery against reform‟s restraint. Each time the media became the stage 
for this drama. The public‟s tolerance for reform eroded.  A government once proficient at 
adapting to reform‟s challenges now struggled and failed to find the momentum to continue. 
This chapter examines reform‟s final unwinding, and more importantly, analyzes how 
stakeholders gained control of the health policy agenda and why the government failed to 
stop this occurrence. 
Early in 1995, positive news once again emerged on the economic front.  The 
economy grew and unemployment fell.  Moreover, the government‟s fiscal management 
plans were on track.  In the budget speech on February 1995, the Finance Minister 
MacKinnon proclaimed that Saskatchewan was “…beginning an era of greater financial 
security and freedom.”1  She revealed that “Not only would there be a balanced budget with a 
surplus of $119 million for 1994/95, this surplus would be followed by three more years of 
small surpluses beginning with a projected $24 million in 1995/96.”2  Though good news, the 
government also indicated its intent to stay committed to a fiscal management strategy.
3
  This 
meant staying focused on balancing the budget, paying down the debt, reducing selected 
taxes, and selectively increasing spending in targeted areas.
4
   
In light of the good budget news, the government also needed to be politically 
sensitive. Ongoing and loud complaints by health stakeholders convinced the government 
that the health sector needed some good news too. Simply, in good fiscal times, harsh health 
spending restraint needed to be eased slightly. More this was an election year. At the same 
time, the government did not want to return to pre-reform spending habits.  Thus the budget 
provided a 3.4 percent increase in health spending,
5
 double the 1.6 percent increase in the 
1994/95 budget.
6
  Though significant, only $20.3 million was new. The reset of the money 
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covered the transfer of Department of Health employees to the new health districts.
7
  The 
new funding targeted community based care, while one percent was for hospitals and 3.1 
percent for nursing homes.
8
  Notably, the Rural Health Initiatives Fund announced a year 
earlier, silently reverted back into the funding pool for health districts.
9
 While it had served 
the purpose of quieting the RHC, the new funding for health hid its disappearance.  
 Tactically, the government determined that it needed to capture as much positive new 
as possible around health care.  Thus, a pre-budget press release announced the $20.3 million 
expenditure.
10
  It also proclaimed that the money represented a new beginning for health 
reform in Saskatchewan.
11
  Furthermore, the money meant more than 460 jobs for nurses, 
home care aides, therapists, and counsellors.
12
  At the same time, the government attempted 
to present this new direction as one of fiscal control instead of cuts.  A seeming response to 
stakeholder calls to end the cuts and job loss.  Notably, the opposition parties quickly 
claimed that the injection of new funding indicated that reform had failed.
13
  
Regrettably an array of negative issues once again spoiled the good news health 
spending story. The first troubling sign emerged a week before the budget, on February 2, 
1995 when Louise Simard stepped down as the Minister of Health.
14
  She initiated, 
understood the long-range goals and captained the government‟s health reform.  For two and 
half years, she bore the brunt of stakeholder anger with health reform.  Her departure did not 
bode well, as for many it signalled a potential waning of the government‟s commitment to 
reform as well as potential dissention over health reform within the government ranks.  The 
timing of Simard‟s departure, before the budget, hints that this was also an effort by the 
government to distance itself from the previous bad news of reform. 
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February also saw the government reignite controversy over health board elections. It 
announced that it planned to appoint four of the twelve members to rural boards, and in 
Saskatoon and Regina, half of the board.
15
  Not only did this signal a retreat from the 
government‟s long heralded democratic election process, it also hinted at the government‟s 
failing confidence in the community-based process.  As expected, the media and opposition 
chastised the government for appointing board members after committing to electing boards 
democratically.
16
   
At the same time, and seemingly surprising the government, the question of health 
board election eligibility also arose.  Not only did the government not have an answer, it 
again found itself involved in an acrimonious public debated.  The SMA, SUN and other 
health unions ignited calls for health employees to be made eligible for election. They hoped 
to stop the government from further influencing the makeup of boards. Elections were an 
opportunity to elect their own members, who could then to advance their interests on boards.  
On the other hand SUMA and SARM were opposed.
17
 Making matters worse, the issue of a 
health board elections date also remerged in the media, as did reminders of its unnecessary 
cost and duplication, juxtaposed against the government‟s previous obsession with health 
spending restraint and efficiency.
18
 This debate lasted throughout the spring of 1995.   
RHC issues also reappeared in February.  The government, it complained, had 
reneged on the terms of the Agreement.  Many rural communities still did not have adequate 
health services.
19
  The media again took notice, while the opposition raised their complaints 
at every opportunity, citing the RHC‟s concerns as more examples of the government‟s 
failure to listen and to keep promises made to rural communities.
20
  A very frustrated 
government tried to argue otherwise. Hospitals had not closed. Funding had been provided 
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for home care, health centres
 
and other health services.
 21
  This failed to ease the agitations 
and anger of the RHC,
22
  nor to reduce the level of media coverage of the RHC‟s concerns.  
More often than not, the RHC problems detracted from the government‟s success stories in 
rural Saskatchewan.  
Further marring the government‟s good news budget and increased health spending, 
the financial pressures facing health boards became known in March when health districts 
released their 1993/94 financial statements.  After one year of operations twenty-nine of 32 
health districts reported deficits totaling $15.1 million.
23
  Almost all districts had failed to 
manage the government‟s funding restraints and their own increased costs.  The opposition 
demanded that the government provide more money districts;
24
 not doing so meant districts 
going broke.  It meant the closure of more hospital beds and loss of services and jobs.
25
 
Moreover, the media and the opposition made it obvious that the government‟s increased 
spending on health in the budget was too little and too late to alleviate these deficits.  In most 
districts, fiscal problems were chronic, and as the opposition predicted, necessitated cuts. 
Adding to the government‟s problems during these early months, cash strapped health 
district ended up in public clashes with physicians, again.  Notably, negotiations begun in 
November 1994 on relation between the SAHO, health boards and the SMA continued, but 
did not slow health boards‟ efforts.  Simply, with scant fiscal resources, board needed to 
exert control over physician services and physician numbers since these areas significantly 
impacted their budgets.
26
  Hence, physicians grew angrier by the week.
27
  Moreover, it 
publicly challenged the government to intercede to curb the boards and speed up the 
negotiation, or else. In a very public media battle, a frustrated SMA threatened to form a 
union for physicians‟ to ensure physicians‟ rights were protected against the power of the 
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boards.
28
 Frustrated physicians would depart leaving communities without care.
 29
  These 
threats caught the attention of both the government, the media, and more importantly, of the 
public who worried about availability of their health services both in rural and urban centres. 
Also angering physicians was slow progress of negotiation for a new service 
agreement.  As a result, another emotional public debate ensued in the media. Their 
agreement expired a year earlier, in April 1994.  Largely, the failing discussion on 
remuneration caused the delay, as simply, the SMA demanded an increase.  The previous 
agreement reduced their fees by one per cent between 1992 and 1994.
 30
  In light of improved 
government finances and the disappearance of the fiscal crisis, physicians refused to 
comprise on their pay.  A public campaign began with the SMA proclaiming that physician‟s 
bore the brunt of health reform.  They had to work harder and longer under the reformed 
system.  They had been blamed for the problems in the health system when if fact health 
boards were the problem. They proclaimed that health districts and the government had 
abandoned the patient because of reform and the focus on cost cutting.  Only the physician 
stood as “… the best and last defense against mediocre medical care….”31  The opposition 
also fanned the public debate.  Physicians, they argued, faced untenable choices about patient 
treatment because there was a lack of resources and beds due to reform‟s restraint.32  Patients 
had to travel further for care.
33
  Hospital closures because of reform reduced access to beds 
and operating times. Saskatchewan‟s health system was failing. Health care in rural 
Saskatchewan was in trouble.
 34
 The government attempted to remain unmoved by the 
SMA‟s concerns.  Acquiescing only opened the door to other stakeholder demands. 
However, the very public debate concerned the government. Indeed, the media and the public 
did not seem sympathetic to the government‟s defences.  
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At the same time, SUN too, in light of years of restraint, grew even more frustrated. 
An even more angry debate than the year prior highlighted the SUN‟s Annual General 
Meeting in April 1995, when over 300 nurses complain they had enough of reform.  They 
tired and they endured an array of problems.  Confusion, turmoil, poor leadership and lack of 
funding created pressure in their workplaces. Then nurses faced job losses, maximum 
workloads, growing vacancies, decreased staffing levels,
35
  and all-pervasive stress.
36
  They 
sat on a time bomb of potential disasters in many facilities.  Nurses believed that they bore 
the heaviest burden of health reform.  More importantly, nurses feared that future budgets 
meant more nursing job losses and worsening working conditions.  Simply, fiscal restraint 
was wearing away nurses‟ support for reform.37   
Reform also failed to deliver real change. Many promises had been made and none 
had been delivered.  SUN called for less focus on costs and more on health reform that 
delivered effective primary health services, and population based and preventative services.
 38
  
There were repeated calls for integrated care, multi-disciplinary teams of salaried providers.
39
  
Even more disappointing, the government failed to tackle physician related issues.  In fact, 
SUN despaired that the government “…made a tactical political decision not to put doctors‟ 
feet to the reform fire….”40  Conversely, SUN noted that even during reform‟s restraint, 
payments to physicians for fee-for-service had grown.
41
  For nurses, the possibility that 
physicians avoided the pain of reform proved concerning and alarming.   
Though nurses and SUN continued to demand that the government act to implement 
real reform
42
 -- without these reforms Wellness meant nothing
43
-- nurses‟ support for 
continued reform and even the government clearly shifted in 1995.  At the 1995 Annual 
General Meeting a solid majority of nurse directed their leadership to be more vocal about 
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issues facing nurses.
44
 They endorsed a proactive media campaign.  They determined that all 
nurses must vocalize their criticism of the government‟s inaction on meaningful reform.45  
SUN for example, once appreciative of any new funds for nurses, now only demonstrated 
tepid support for the new dollars for in-scope salaries and new positions in the 1995/96 
provincial budget.  These funds in their view “…just filling in the cracks left by previous 
budgets.
”46
   
Not only was the public suddenly subjected to media coverage of irritated nurses, the 
intensity of SUN‟s frustrations and attacks on physicians‟ even caught the attention of the 
SMA and physicians.  At the SMA May 1995 Annual Meeting discussion on relations with 
other health care providers resulted in a conciliatory gesture.  The meeting passed a 
resolution expressing physicians‟ “…concern about, and support for, all providers of health 
care adversely affected by health system down-sizing and that they be acknowledged for 
their efforts to provide quality care in spite of the unfavorable conditions that they are 
working under.”47  While not explicit, the SMA‟s effort to recognize the trials of health 
workers did not go unnoticed by either SUN or the public. 
Physicians‟ sudden and surprising empathy for nurses arose because at the end of the 
day they too felt reform‟s pressure on key areas of their domain. In particular, heath boards‟ 
efforts to exert their authority over physicians continued even though a Framework 
Agreement was signed in May 1995.
48
  Importantly, the agreement defined physicians‟ roles 
in the health system and their relations with health districts, including how districts 
negotiated terms and conditions of engagement with physicians.
49
  A dispute resolution 
process was created.
50
  Yet, shortly after signing the agreement, physician-district relations 
grew tense again.  Largely, even with agreement, budget strapped boards had no choice. For 
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example, just days after the signing, the Saskatoon Health Board attempted to restrict 
hospital privileges for its physicians.
51
  Understandably, with no relief available, boards‟ 
relations with physicians remained in a state of conflict.  Unfortunately, these disputes played 
out in the media.  
An upcoming provincial election meant that the frustrations of nurses and physicians 
concerned the government.  Importantly, this frustration shifted the public‟s views of reform. 
A May 1995 poll found that health reform jumped two spots from a year earlier, to become 
people‟s 2nd highest concern.52  In addition, 41 percent thought government had done a poor 
job reforming the health system and over 58 percent said that health services had 
deteriorated.
53
  Hence, just months after good news budget in February, the government was 
once again losing the public relations battle over health reform.   
Notably the government needed to mend two problems if it hoped to stop health 
reform from becoming an election issue.  Importantly, while not the sole reason for declining 
public support of the government, reform proved to be one of the more important.
 54
 In this 
regard, stakeholders concerns with health reform played a major role.  Simply, the public 
seemed to be wearying of health restraint imposed on stakeholders during times of a good 
news budget. Thus, while not prepared to stop reform, the government responded by 
changing the messages.  New about health initiatives and emphasized investments in 
community and home care became the focus.  The government promoted increased funding 
for community and health programs.  It no longer referred at all to fiscal management, health 
care cuts and reform.
55
 As a result, health reform became health renewal.
56
 This term 
conveyed stabilized funding for health services and assurances to health care providers that 
they would be involved in designing and implementing future health services.
57
  More 
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importantly, these efforts worked. A Maclean‟s poll in June 1995 indicated that overall 
public support for the NDP rebounded to almost 51 percent.
58
  
As a result, health was not a major issue during the June 1995 election campaign.  A 
couple of explanations could explain this outcome.  While SUN‟s view of reform shifted, and 
in spite of the increased anxiety and frustrations of SUN‟s members, and though relations 
with the NDP government had become strained and SUN was skeptical about the NDP‟s 
commitments, SUN did not want to defeat the NDP government.  Simply, they had no 
choice. The Conservatives and the Liberals offered no viable alternative; these parties had 
already indicated their support for continuing reform and historically, were not particularly 
supportive of unions. Yet, SUN did not endorse the NDP.  Instead, SUN set out to raise 
awareness about nursing issues, about the state of health care and to win public support for 
these issues.  If, and when, the NDP was reelected, SUN intended to be well positioned.  
Thus, through the election campaign SUN‟s leadership tempered its attacks on the NDP.  
Instead it launched its time to blow the whistle campaign.
59
  The campaign focused on 
encouraging the public to call for the government to act on real reform:  physician reforms, 
primary care, and the expansion of nursing roles and the roles of other health professionals in 
the system.
60
  Questionnaires were distributed to 6,000 nurses asking them to track their 
experiences under health reform and to report instances where health care cuts jeopardized 
patient care.   These emotive and personal stories offered the necessary ammunition to press 
the government into addressing nursing issues.   
The SMA‟s approach to the election was similar to that of SUN. While individual 
physicians publicly noted their concerns with health reform in the media during the 
campaign, the SMA avoided public confrontations. They did not endorse any party and 
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focused their comments on issues around patient care, remuneration and health boards. 
Seemingly, like SUN, the SMA appreciated that given the probability of an NDP victory, 
elevating their concerns publicly offered more opportunity than siding with other parties to 
defeat the government.  
Importantly, the problems in both the Liberal and Conservative campaigns also 
seemed key.  Liberal leader Linda Haverstock, already a supporter of health reform, damaged 
her trustworthiness further when she admitted she, “…wouldn‟t roll back any of the NDP‟s 
rural hospital closures.”61 More importantly, her criticisms of Wellness were dismissed when 
early in the campaign she became linked with the federal Liberal government‟s cuts to health 
transfers.
62
  Similarly, the Conservatives continued to be seriously hampered by the lingering 
scandals from the Devine years.  Then, their leader, Bill Boyd, backed away from promising 
to reopen hospitals further damaging their credibility.
63
  Then he suggested that the private 
sector might provide solutions to health care‟s problems.64  In the end, according to the 
media, there were no health issues in the election as all parties agreed on the need for health 
care reform, and for government spending to be reduced.
65
  Thus, even suggestions that 
Romanow avoided campaigning in constituencies where hospitals had closed did not become 
an issue in the campaign.
66
  
In the end, the electorate‟s message on health reform was mixed.  Romanow‟s 
government won 42 of the legislature‟s 58 seats (in 1991 the legislature had 66 seats of 
which the NDP held 55).  Though the NDP majority declined, the party captured 47 percent 
of the popular vote, down four percent from 1991.
67
  The Liberals increased their seats from 
one to eleven, and the Conservatives dropped to five from ten, losing their official opposition 
status.  In the twenty-three ridings where hospitals had closed, the NDP retained thirteen 
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seats, the Liberals six and the Conservative held four.
68
  Liberal Jim Melenchuk, former 
President of the SMA, narrowly lost to the NDP incumbent after campaigning against the 
NDP on health care reform.  On the other hand, Glen McPherson, a former NDP MLA who 
had crossed the floor to the Liberal‟s in August 1993, and who had been highly critical of 
government‟s health reform agenda, was elected.69  Liberal Anita Bergman, who won a 
Regina by-election a few months earlier, was defeated.   
For the most part, the outcome contained a number of meanings for the government.  
On one hand, a number of rural communities signaled displeasure with the NDP and reform, 
since NDP lost the majority of its seats in rural areas.  The outcome might also mean that the 
victory handed Romanow a strong mandate to stay the course, including health reform.
70
  
Yet, one media report went so far as to suggest that the results did not mean people supported 
health reform, just that they had no choice: “There was no joy in voting NDP, not even for 
diehard social activists or union agitators who make up what‟s left of the left…but what other 
choice did they have?”71  In the end, the election provided the government with little 
measurement on overall public views on health reform. However, Romanow now faced a 
Liberal official opposition in the Legislature.  These Liberals had a clear agenda aimed at 
aggressively opposing the NDP‟s health reform. This outcome, though insignificant at the 
time, meant there were credible anti-reform voices in the Legislature, and one individual with 
a personal grudge (Glen McPherson), targeted at health reform. 
Following the election a lull settled over the province and the health system. That lull 
ended in August when the government announced an October 1995 date for health board 
elections, though, the controversy focused on the declaration that health care employees were 
eligible for board positions.
72
   The news attracted mixed reviews.  Many, including the 
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media, worried about a deluge of health workers elected to boards and who could then skew 
the decisions of the boards. On the other hand, health stakeholders rejoiced. Now they could 
possibly move into leadership positions in their district and thus advance their issues and 
maybe obtain resolutions.  As result, the government nonetheless faced having to again 
defend its decisions. 
Interestingly, the real problem with the elections arose in September when 
nominations opened.  The government faced immediate questions from the media and from 
the opposition over fears that special interests intended to dominate the elections.  Ironically, 
months earlier the government identified the problem and had solved it when they decided to 
appoint board members. Yet, as predicted, though to the dismay of the government, health 
stakeholders organized and campaigned on single issues.
 73
 The Saskatchewan Health 
Coalition joined with SUN, the SFL and other unions to run candidates or to support targeted 
candidates. Together, they advocated for the Health Coalition‟s Platform for Progress which 
called for the protection and expansion of health services across Saskatchewan.
74
  All told, 
coalition candidates represented fifty-five of the 509 candidates. SUN too encouraged nurses 
to take an active role in health board elections, and they financed a public campaign that 
encouraged support for nurses or candidates who supported nursing issues.  These efforts 
paid off. Nurses captured over 31 percent of health board seats.
75
   
The outcome of the election proved less positive for the government.  After years of 
working with appointed and generally supportive boards, it now faced elected health boards 
with strong interests in advancing their own agenda and issues.  More importantly, the level 
of public apathy created a great deal of disappointment for the government.  Few took notice 
of the elections, and even fewer actually voted.  Simply, the much ballyhooed democratic 
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process had failed to garner much interest.  The message to government was evident:  
ownership of their health system did not interest people, nor for that matter, did they 
seemingly want to participate in health reform.  A government once enthused with health 
reform could only be disappointed. 
In light of the election outcome, the government moved quickly to proactively 
prevent problems with the new and potentially activist boards. Soon after the elections the 
Department of Health organized a meeting with SAHO and the health districts to set clear 
guidelines around defining the new boards‟ roles, authority and accountability.  The two 
signed a Framework of Accountability agreement that fall.
76
  The framework defined the 
parameters and expectations of the partnership between government, districts and the public 
and laid out accountability measures for the use of government funds.
77
  More importantly, it 
affirmed that the Minister of Health was responsible for the overall health system and made 
the boards accountable to the provincial government, not to their communities.
78
 A Health 
Districts Advisory Committee was established to enhance communications and consultations 
between the Department and health districts.  This too served as a buffer. It ensured that these 
new and possibly less amenable boards had an immediate conduit to the Department to 
circumvent any public discussion on issues. 
Unfortunately for the government, almost immediately, the new boards faced old 
problems. The release of the 1994/95 fiscal statements showed that the deficits identified at 
the end of the previous year had not disappeared, though they were somewhat reduced year 
over year.  Twenty-seven districts reported operating deficits which together totaled $6.4 
million.
79
  While this was a significant drop from the previous year‟s $15 million,80 almost 
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every district lacked the funds to match growing expenditures.  Hence, these deficits 
signalled ongoing and in fact, growing, financial problems.   
In December, the new health boards, already alarmed by their own fiscal problems, 
grew agitated when the government signaled that cuts in federal transfers may be passed on 
to districts.  For the current year, this meant a reduction of more than $50 million in 
provincial health funding.  More were to come in future.
81
  While it is unclear whether the 
government intended to use federal cuts as a new fiscal crisis and thus a need for ongoing 
provincial spending fiscal restraint, the announcement effectively created tension and anxiety 
amongst boards.  SAHO publicly decried the offloading of federal cuts, claiming that it 
would lead to damaging reductions in health district budgets.
82
  Rather than cut health, 
SAHO argued, it would “…like to see that the pain is being felt across government…” that 
“Health has taken hard cuts in the past….”83  The Saskatoon Health District and the Regina 
District expressed public concern over these cuts.
 84
 Even Saskatoon‟s City Council took the 
unusual step of devoting a portion of its agenda to discussions of the impact of these federal 
cuts on Saskatchewan‟s health care.85   
SUN too became alarmed.  More district budget cuts meant the loss of jobs and 
increased workloads for nurses.  A distraught SUN responded in November 1995 by 
launching another very aggressive public education campaign called Stop the Silence.  
Nurses were told to take a stand in their workplaces against inadequate staffing levels and 
heavy workloads which prevented appropriate nursing care.  Violations of nursing standards 
were to be documented. In addition, SUN initiated a billboard campaign highlighting the 
deterioration of patient care and increased workloads for nurses.  The campaign also pointed 
out that Wellness cuts costs and nothing more. If the government truly wanted for reform it 
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should deal with physicians, who in their view, had been excluded from health reform, while 
protecting nurses and beds, both of which had been slashed.   
Importantly, SUN‟s increased activism occurred in step with its contract negotiations 
with SAHO.  The collective agreement expired in March 1996 and initial conversations with 
SAHO suggested that SUN faced a tough bargaining environment.  Yet, nurses were aware 
that the government had just signed a generous new service agreement with the SMA. This 
simply annoyed SUN, who viewed it as a signal that the government feared taking a stand 
against physicians.  Physicians received a fee increase of 2.5 percent.
86
  A onetime bonus of 
$1.1 million was to be distributed amongst the province‟s 1,200 doctors.87 Physicians also 
secured a commitment that a new payment system would not be implemented in the near 
future. While the government hoped the agreement alleviated the anxiety felt by 
Saskatchewan‟s physicians,88 SUN was not impressed. It suggested the contract was, 
“…generous given the provinces finances.”89  More likely, the government used contract 
negotiations with the SMA to reduce growing physician unrest, while it seemingly had less 
concern over nurses‟ unrest.  Needless to say, it had the opposite effect on SUN.  SUN no 
longer believed that the government desired real change; instead, the government agenda was 
about reducing costs by shifting the burden to nurses.
90
  This marked a significant turning.  
Health board reactions to potential cuts, as well as angry nurses, had the government 
backpedaling by December on its suggestion that it intended to offload of federal cuts 
through to districts.  Rather than passing them through, the government retreated, 
commenting that the province would look for ways to “…cushion the blow.”91  Though this 
alleviated tension around future funding for health care, it also demonstrated an unmistakable 
retreat by the government.  Stakeholders now understood that provincial fiscal crisis no 
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longer constrained the government. More importantly, it became evident that improved 
government finances and provincial economy meant backing away was easier than the pain 
of adhering to fiscal constraint. Thus by the end of 1995, the government faced a double 
edged sword: it remained committed to health spending restraint while no longer facing a 
fiscal crisis.   
The March 1996 provincial budget illustrated the depth of the problem.  The budget 
forecast an improved economy, a year end surplus of $8 million, and a projected surplus of 
$22 million for 1997/98.
92
  Enough money existed in the government coffers for a 
substantive pay down of the provincial debt, and for hints of possible tax cuts in the near 
future.
93
  However, the budget also held health spending to zero percent for 1996/97 and for 
1997/98.
94
 Though federal cuts had not passed through to districts, this was still not good 
news. The government‟s zero percent really created, for most boards, a two to three percent 
cut, with inflation and other costs.
95
  This proved difficult.  Boards had already made 
significant reductions in operating costs over the previous two years.  They had used 
amalgamations, reductions of duplication and waste, and improved system efficiencies. Most 
had spent their reserves and many ran deficits.  No increase in funding for two years meant 
that health boards needed to again turn to program and service cuts. They had no choice. Yet, 
further cuts were not only ill advised, but in their view, undermined Wellness.
96
  The 
government, however, was unsympathetic.  Boards were told that the province did not intend 
to cover deficits; health boards needed to find ways to manage these shortfalls within the 
funding they received.
97
  As expected, health boards and stakeholders felt anger over the 
government‟s seemingly hard response. Interestingly, even the media portrayed it as 
bordering on insensitive. 
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Further aggravating this anger, in April 1996 the government announced the final 
1996/97 breakdown of needs-based funding.
98
  The formula imposed budget reductions of as 
much as 3.3 percent for nineteen rural health districts.
99
  Left with no choice, cuts began 
anew.  Immediately, the cuts hit senior‟s complexes, nursing home beds and special care 
homes in a number of rural communities. More nurses, along with other health care workers, 
lost their jobs. News of these cuts sparked anger throughout rural Saskatchewan.    Once 
again, the rural media was filled with stories condemning the government over its disregard 
for rural communities.
100
 These stories also now told of seniors separated from each other or 
from their families.  Yet, urban districts fared slightly better.
101
  Though, eleven saw funding 
increases,
102
  these funds were not enough.  Even with an additional 0.5 per cent in new 
funding, the Saskatoon Health District predicted layoffs and reorganization because of an 
operating shortfall.
103
  Similarly, the Regina Health District‟s $13 million shortfall over two 
years meant cutting one hundred jobs and closing sixty-four acute care beds and a twenty-
two bed senior‟s facility.104  The Regina district also reaffirmed its 1993 decision to close the 
Plains Hospital triggering another round of large public protests in Regina.  An exasperated 
board defended its decisions by noting that it “…really had no other viable opportunity or 
alternative because the Government basically said we will just cut the funding if you do not 
continue the process.”105  Again, the media filled its pages with stories of cuts, job losses and 
upset health workers and patients. 
SUN, facing the loss of more nursing jobs, was truly angered.  Nurses yet again 
seemingly carried the burden of the cuts.  On top of these cuts, the slow pace of their contract 
negotiations made them even angrier.  SAHO refused to find the funds to resolve nurses‟ 
issues; the government refused to provide funding to pay for a contract settlement.
106
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Though wages were the key issue, other issues garnered higher levels of interest: pensions, 
job protection, workplace stress and staffing levels.   
 Frustrated, depressed, and demoralized nurses at SUN‟s 1996 spring Annual General 
Meeting voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining the SFL.
107
  Once supportive of the 
government and health reform, nurses now believed they had no choice. They needed 
organized labour‟s help in protecting their interests. Though ratification of SUN‟s 
membership in the SFL was not scheduled until the November 1996 SFL convention, the 
moment SUN passed the resolution, the concerns of SUN‟s members instantly became the 
concerns of 70,000 unionized workers in Saskatchewan.
108
  Suddenly, every one of these 
workers became informed of SUN‟s struggles and the problems in the health system.  
SUN also began immediately to publically criticize health reform. In the media, at 
public and private meetings, it demanded that the government provide more money for health 
care.
109
  SUN shrewdly argued that lack of funding hindered patient care and safety. Layoffs, 
stress related sick leave and unsafe working environments endangered the well being of 
Saskatchewan‟s health system.110 Without more money, health districts put the bottom line 
ahead of patient wellbeing and the reason districts had no money.   The emotional attacks 
honed in on one fact: “….the province has to provide more cash….”111   
Physicians too expressed growing concerns and even opposition to health boards and 
health reform, the latter of which caused the problem.  Pressure from the health boards, 
largely due to growing financial difficulties, continued even with the agreement in place.  In 
fact it worsened.  Hence, physicians took to blaming health boards for a range of problems:  
failing patient care; difficulty accessing beds and services; reduced auxiliary services; 
nursing cuts; and increased physician workloads. Moreover, rural physicians, the hardest hit 
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by the governments‟ restraint, were at the end of their rope. None of the government‟s 
promises materialized. There were fewer, not more physicians practicing. Physicians now 
travelled further distances.   They often worked seven days a week without a break. Access to 
quality health care was deteriorating in rural Saskatchewan,
112
 while waiting lists 
increased.
113
  At the SMA Annual Meeting in April an annoyed group greeted the Minister of 
Health‟s visit.114  Frustrations were loudly expressed.115  The meeting heard that 60 percent 
of physicians intended to leave Saskatchewan if workloads were not reduced.
116
  Even 
foreign doctors did not want to work in rural Saskatchewan because of these working 
conditions.
117
   Even more disturbing for the government, the public responded by indicating 
its empathy for physician complaints.   
Likewise, the Minister of Health encountered 350 angry health board members and 
CEOs at SAHO‟s quarterly meeting in May 1996.  These discussions contrasted starkly with 
the reception given to the Minister at their inaugural meeting in December 1995.
118
  They 
challenged him on a range of issues, of which funding ranked first.  Participants also raised 
the issue of the workplace moral:  nurses and physicians were in uproar.
119
 While less public 
about their concerns, on the whole, boards tired of acting as the intermediary between the 
government and nurses and physicians.  The message, though, clearly conveyed their 
frustration and concerns about finding no relief from the government. 
These numerous heighted public confrontations involving the government and nurses, 
physicians and health boards carried an ominous signal that reform was stalling.  The media 
aggravated the tone not only by their level of coverage of the issues. In turn, they too began 
questioning health reform‟s direction.  In particular, health boards recieved a sympathetic 
ear, while the government was criticized for dodging its responsibility for creating the 
Chapter 4: The End of Health Reform (1995 & 1996) 
 
 
107 
problems.  One media commentator observed that “It‟s time that [Eric]Cline [Minister of 
Health] and his colleagues stopped using the health boards as a shield and accepted the 
responsibility for the government‟s financial decisions.”120  Another media story noted that 
“Instead of dealing with problems directly, it [the government] has abdicated its public and 
political responsibility by passing off the problems onto local health boards that are unable to 
cope with the situation dumped on them.”121  More importantly, the media challenged the 
government‟s leadership:  “What‟s developed is the perception that the Romanow 
government has, in essence, abandoned the health-care system.”122   
Regular media reports about the failings of health reform grew over the spring months 
with each new stakeholder flare-up, and significantly damaged the government‟s leadership 
and credibility. The reports spoke of substandard care, of cash strapped hospitals requiring 
patients to supply their own soap, slippers and house-coats,
123
 of weeping seniors relocated to 
distant facilities, and of patients having to lay in hallways for hours or even days for care.
 124
 
The opposition, seeing the deteriorating views of reform, increased its attacks bringing 
forward more emotional tales of a failing health system. The government soon detested 
attending Question Period because of the endless health care stories. 
125
 Indeed, by the end of 
the 1996 spring session the Minister of Health fielded more than 700 questions; twice as 
many as any other minister.
126
   
Public opinion of reform worsened over the summer largely in response to these 
escalations in stakeholder commentary and media reports.  Unfortunately, even positive news 
on reorganizing labour relations in the health sector garnered very little response from 
stakeholders.  The Health Labour Relations Reorganization Act tasked a commission 
(Dorsey Commission) with completing a comprehensive review and reorganization of 
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collective bargaining in Saskatchewan‟s health sector. 127   For many, the effort came too late.  
Frustrated and discouraged employees and health boards, besieged by the problems of health 
reform, simply they no longer believed that anything associated with reform offered positive 
results. 
Moreover, health districts also became more vocal. In essence, the elected health 
boards, possibly due to their large stakeholder representation, emerged as independent and 
very credible commentators on the health system.
128
  They were no longer sycophants of the 
government, but democratically elected local bodies expressing serious concerns.  Funding 
issues pushed them to the edge. As a result, they publicly pressed the government, calling for 
increased funding and then threatened job and service cuts if none was forthcoming.  The 
board‟s criticisms, more so than any other stakeholder, caused a serious problem for the 
government. 
Likewise, rural people too scaled up their longstanding resistance to reform.
129
  Over 
June and July six communities sued or announced plans to sue the government over health 
care funding.  To the dismay of the government some of these communities won their 
lawsuits, validating accusations that the government had failed to act to protect rural health 
care.
130
  In addition, the RHC also began to agitate again. It stated disappointment, frustration 
and anger, at what it considered to be the government‟s unwillingness to honour the 
Agreement -- funding for services in their communities.
 131
 
In response to the intensifying negative views of reform, the government tried to stop 
the damage by providing its members with good news stories and facts on health reform and 
more importantly, on the state of Saskatchewan‟s health system.132  Importantly, the 
documentation distanced the government from the cuts and reorganization associated with 
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health reform and spoke of investments.  Gone too was any reference to health reform and 
Wellness, or the Vision for Health Care. Instead government members referred to health 
renewal.
133
 This effort did not work. Good news stories from politicians could not convince a 
public inundated with stakeholder stories of their experiences with a failing health system.   
Moreover, pointing the finger at the province‟s financial problems was quickly 
discouraged.  The government had learned the hard way that improved finances no longer, 
even in the face of limited revenues, justified reform. One media story noted for example 
that, “Blaming it all on Ottawa becomes the obvious defence but there is a big problem when 
pleading poverty…This government is receiving an extra $100 million a year from VLTs and 
casinos and has just received a $50 million-dividend from its Crowns.”134     
In effect, by the end of the summer of 1996, almost every stakeholder in the province 
voiced opposition to continued health reform and specifically, to continued health spending 
restraint.  These voices focused singularly on ending to cuts and adding new funding for 
health.  By the end of the summer, the government faced a wave of anti reform sentiments.
 Its fortunes worsened. SUN began an aggressive set of anti health reform campaigns. 
Each focused on raising concerns with staffing levels and patient safety while calling for 
more funds.  The first campaign encouraged nurses to speak out, write a letters, organize and 
attend meetings to raise public awareness of nurses‟ frustrations and of the stresses caused by 
reform.  As a result, passionate letters appeared in newspapers. One for example, expressed 
heartfelt frustration:  “The health-care system is at a breaking point…We can‟t cope any 
longer! We can‟t do more with less….”135  Whenever possible – at public meetings, call in 
shows, and MLA offices– nurses told tales of harassed and tired nurses, poor patient care and 
of stress.
136
 Then SUN began a second campaign:  “Stop the Silence”.  The campaign raised 
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public awareness about the crisis in health care and the failings of health reform by releasing 
daunting testimonials gathered during the nursing survey from the previous year‟s blow the 
whistle campaign.
 137
 
138
  On the heels of this campaign, SUN then launched another. In 
August over 147,000 pamphlets were distributed door-to-door in Saskatoon, Regina and 100 
other communities,
139
  and eight billboards appeared across the province reading:  „Is health 
care in crisis? Ask a registered nurse.’  Each pamphlet was tailored to a specific community 
and had a tear off portion for comments, which the public was asked to return to SUN.  The 
response was overwhelming. SUN delivered, in publicly staged events, boxes upon boxes of 
tear offs to the Minister of Health.  Each carried a story of an ailing health system.
140
 
During the summer of 1996, SUN made another strategic decision and one that had 
dire consequences for the government. SUN‟s public criticisms of physicians disappeared.  
Though not a formal coming together, SUN now aligned itself with physicians under a 
common concern: ending cuts and increasing health funding.
141
  Calls for physician reform 
vanished. SUN also toned down appeals for moving forward with wellness.  Ultimately, SUN 
and nurses alike now concluded that reform‟s promises to nurses‟ meant nothing. Simply, the 
government did not intend to carry out its commitments – integration of medical services, 
expanded roles for nurses and community health centres – to nurses. 142   Physicians and the 
medical model would continue to dominate. Ongoing reform only meant more cuts and job 
losses.  In the end, SUN believed reform doomed nurses and patients to more pain.  SUN‟s 
president summed up nurses‟ views: “If reform continues as it has, the system will „flatline‟ 
the same way a dead patient does.”143  Working alongside physicians to stop reform was their 
only alternative. 
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Suddenly, with the convergence of SUN and physicians into a single voice against reform, 
the most powerful stakeholders stood united in their attack on reform and the government.  
Protests erupted again in rural Saskatchewan. With them all focused on condemning reform, 
public perception shifted.  The public became convinced that reform hurt the quality of 
patient care.
144
  A poll in June 1996 signaled the support for reform fell, and that 68 percent 
of Saskatchewan‟s residents did not like the way government managed the health system.145  
Taking note of the changed sentiments, the media observed that “...health care has exploded 
at the grassroots level this year unlike anything this province has seen for years.”146   
Health reform had become a major political problem.  Thus, by the end of the 
summer of 1996 unrest had taken hold leading even the media to question the government‟s 
wisdom in continuing with health reform:  
…petitions and protests over hospital closures, the poor morale among 
workers barely coping with increased workloads even as the threat of more 
layoffs hang over them, doctors and therapists moving away because of stress 
and the government‟s own polling shows growing public concern over the 
health system…To the outsider, it must seem a project gone horribly wrong.  
Dr. Romanow‟s prescription for the ailing health system appears to be slowly 
killing the patient.
 147
 
 
As a result, the government understood that continuing on the reform path could only lead to 
declining public support.
148
   
Hence, after a summer of intense and unrelenting pressure, on August 20, 1996, it 
relented. That day, the government announced an additional $40 million in new funds for 
district boards.
149
  This new funding was to “…mitigate the effects of the rapid 
restructuring…,”150 though in reality, the funding provided a much needed release valve for 
a system stressed by cuts.
151
  While the government argued that it had not reacted to public 
pressure, claiming the money came from higher-than-anticipated resource revenues, they did 
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acknowledge at the time that the pace of health renewal has been somewhat too fast.
152
  
However, clearly criticism of health reform had found its mark.
153
 Health reform, as 
conceived in August 1991, had effectively ended.   
Notably, the 1997/98 budget added $70 million into health spending, with $62 
million directed to district health boards.
154
  The infusion of funding continued in 
subsequent budgets.  Moreover, the government abandoned its efforts at a transformation 
shift away from the medical model. Without stakeholder support, the more difficult second 
stage could not be achieved. 
After five years, health reform succumbed to stakeholder holder pressures.  These 
pressures clearly grew in step with concessions to stakeholders and just as importantly, 
concessions that corresponded with the provincial improving finances.  Each budget offered 
more spending.  Thus, while improved finances opened the door, so too did the unwillingness 
of government to shoulder the constant attacks by stakeholders. These attacks first shifted the 
media and then the public‟s views, ultimately wearing away at the government‟s confidence 
that it could survive these criticisms through the most important litmus test of future 
elections. Political expediency won over the sound policy of the health reform agenda.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Between 1991 and 1996 the Saskatchewan NDP government attempted to execute 
one of the most far reaching health reform policy agendas in Canada. The story of 
Saskatchewan‟s health reform is not, however, solely about the policy outcomes of reform, 
such as, for example, regionalization or needs-based funding.  Instead, the analysis and 
narrative of the previous chapters demonstrate that under the NDP government health reform 
was a major policy undertaking, the implementation of which involved a mix of strategies 
and approaches indispensable to overcoming the many obstacles presented by a central and 
influential participant in Saskatchewan‟s health system: health stakeholders.   In essence, the 
discussion illustrated that “how” health reform was implemented is just as, if not more 
important than the policy outcomes that the government hoped to achieve through its health 
reform agenda.   
While much has been written about health reform policy outcomes, limited analysis 
has been undertaken on the mechanics of implementing health reform, and moreover, why 
those governments who have attempted health reform, have failed.  Health care reform and 
its sound policy objectives are more often than not trumped by the political objectives of 
health stakeholders.   Moreover, even those authors – Davidson, O`Fee, Adams and Wetzel –  
who have considered implementation and the integration of health stakeholders as important, 
omitted an analysis of the tactics and strategies governments adopted to manage health 
stakeholders through the health reform process. It may be possible that most health scholars 
find that contextualizing health stakeholders evolving and varying views, and their 
unpredictable nature, is too difficult and produces little new value. Ultimately, the outcome is 
the same. Though, Saskatchewan‟s health reform achieved small successes (regionalization, 
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system rationalization, etc.), on the whole, it fell short of its revolutionary wellness goals. 
Stakeholders prevailed over the government‟s agenda, again. 
 The complex characteristics of health stakeholders and the health environment make 
the adoption of a narrative or case study approach particularly effective in reducing the 
difficulty of this analysis and in producing a detailed picture of Saskatchewan‟s health 
reform experience.  It creates a better representation of the vibrant, involved nature of 
government-stakeholder relations, and demonstrates the important dynamics between 
Saskatchewan‟s health stakeholders, the press and public opinion, and how those dynamics 
influenced the government‟s support of, or retreat from, Wellness.  Despite the sound policy 
objectives of health reform it was the politics of health care – the political interplay of these 
stakeholders –that led the government to abandon its health reform agenda. 
In fact it is important to remember, governments by their nature have the power to 
impose reform upon their citizens. This is especially true in Saskatchewan‟s case where the 
NDP government had a sizeable majority and thus firmly controlled the legislative tools 
needed to implement its reform agenda. Arbitrarily implementing reform, though, was not an 
optimal choice. Such an action would understandably lead to resentment, ill feelings, and in 
the end, result in diminished public support for the reform agenda, and ultimately, hinder the 
government‟s future electoral success.  More importantly, a populist party like the NDP did 
not consider reform by fiat an acceptable option. 
The problems associated with implementing health reform and managing the diverse 
and powerful health stakeholders help to explain why governments need a marshaling force 
or a motivating crisis to convince them of the necessity of proceeding with a reform agenda. 
In 1991 the NDP government faced circumstances that left it no alternative to health reform: 
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the province‟s finances. Simply, a fiscal crisis created both the unyielding pressure for 
change, and as well, the window of opportunity.  From the beginning, the province‟s 
catastrophic financial state instilled upon the NDP government a sense of urgency that all 
public spending needed to be controlled – including  spending to support health care.  Thus, 
the fiscal crisis was a fortuitous occurrence for the NDP government. It became the anchor 
for health reform.  It forced the government to act.  It was a powerful factor in generating 
public support for dramatic changes in the health care system.  And it made it difficult for 
stakeholders to oppose reform, at least in its early stages. 
 Moreover, health spending faced a chronic fiscal crisis of its own.  Health care 
expenditures represented more than 30 percent of the government‟s spending and had, for 
years, grown faster than spending in other program areas. It also outpaced growth in the 
province‟s GDP.  Thus, health spending was unsustainable and its contribution to the 
provinces fiscal problems, undeniable. Moreover, health spending materialized partly 
because of an outdated and inefficient health system that had become resistant to change.  
Yet, it is clearly a system in need of changing.  Its problems and failings and the necessity of 
reform had been evidenced by a number of provincial commissions and studies whose 
recommendations were supported by a large majority of health stakeholders.  Therefore, 
understandably, health reform became an integral component of both restoring the province‟s 
fiscal health and of repairing the province‟s health system.  
 The fiscal crisis provided an opportunity by fostering public and stakeholder support 
for health reform. Polling showed that in 1992 and 1993 the public placed a higher priority 
on restoring the province‟s finances than on maintaining the health care status quo.  Thus, 
health stakeholders found it difficult to oppose reform in its early stages. Maintaining the 
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support of the public became a key element of the government‟s reform exercise, as without 
that support, an NDP government became susceptible to pressures within its own party and 
from health stakeholders.  
Financial pressure also played a role in elevating the sense of urgency for health 
reform, and thereby quickened the pace of many of the difficult and more problematic 
aspects of health reform. Some have argued that this damaged the government‟s reform effort 
and the government‟s credibility since it forced the government to intercede in, for example, 
hospital closures.  This analysis suggests it was instead an advantage.  For example, difficult 
choices such as hospitals closures, needs-based funding and program and service changes 
across the province, were implemented in a relatively short period of time, putting to an end, 
painful delays and anxiety. Essentially, Saskatchewan‟s fiscal crisis carried health 
stakeholders and the public through the difficult and agonizing decisions quickly.  
While the fiscal crisis unquestionably underpinned Saskatchewan‟s health reform, the 
government also understood that health reform was a political process.  Saskatchewan‟s 
health system was institutionalized and entrenched, the upshot of a community of vested, 
powerful, well organized and well funded stakeholders.  Confrontation and conflict was an 
intrinsic part of that process and in order to succeed the government needed to control, 
anticipate, diagnose and respond to this dynamic stakeholder environment.  By doing just 
that, reform lasted from 1991 until 1996 and along the way became a protracted policy 
process littered with messy interactions, compromises, concessions, contradictions and 
potential political pitfalls.     
The government‟s approach to a successful health reform policy process was 
multifaceted, though a number of key strategies were critical.   Central and probably the most 
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important aspect of health reform proved to be public relations and messaging.  From the 
beginning, the government understood that it had to control and manage public perceptions 
of reform. Health stakeholders already had significant public credibility.  Rightly so, their 
professions spoke of caring and nurturing, while they worked in environments where people 
trusted and relied on their knowledge and abilities.  Conversely, politicians‟ of all stripes 
were regarded sceptically.    
Stakeholders had good reason to be wary of the NDP government‟s motivations. 
Reform, in spite of its many positive connotations, contained numerous contradictions.  
Wellness actually enhanced, not reduced, the government‟s control of the health system 
through regionalization, which centralized a previously decentralized and very community-
based health system. Oversight and province-wide coordination by the government increased.  
Community-based boards implemented needs-based funding that reflected a formulated set 
of objectives, while the government retained ownership for setting global funding levels for 
districts.  Health board oversight aimed to take control of the system away from physicians, 
who had acted as the system‟s gate keepers.  What is more, a fiscal crisis shaped reform and 
so cost reduction and restraint became the motivating force behind all of the government‟s 
decisions. Thus, on the whole, reform meant lost jobs, major changes and transitions, and 
disempowerment for many stakeholders in the health community. 
As a result, managing reform through the dynamics of Saskatchewan‟s health 
stakeholder environment became the central strategy behind the success of the NDP 
government reform agenda. The government worked hard to convince stakeholders to 
support and participate in reform, or as a minimum remain neutral.  Doing so meant aligning 
reform with stakeholders self interests as, the government understood, stakeholders would 
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support change so long as that change benefitted their member constituencies. However, just 
as quickly, stakeholders would oppose reform when it offered no benefits, or when it eroded 
their members‟ interests.  Thus, keeping stakeholders on side involved the proverbial carrot-
and-stick approach – catering to stakeholders‟ inherent interests, while when necessary, 
raising the specter of the fiscal crisis.    
The government also used a range of other stakeholder management strategies.  For 
example, it developed close relationships with as many stakeholders as possible, though, it 
again prioritized both SUN and the SMA for special attention.  Special committees, 
meetings, discussions and open-doors ensured proactive dialogue on issues in order to 
preempt potential problems.  The government‟s tactics also very effectively prevented 
stakeholders from unifying in opposition to health reform.  Moreover, it averted unnecessary 
irritations for both stakeholders and the public with a smooth, methodical implementation 
process. Together, these strategies proved effective in mitigating problems that arose and 
easing some of the stresses associated with reform. However, none carried the same impact 
upon health stakeholders as the fiscal imperative. 
Understandably, health reform‟s demise came because the government lost this fiscal 
imperative with the return of the province‟s financial health.  Yet, the real retreat from 
reform began long before the province‟s fiscal recovery. As stakeholders became more 
critical of reform, their views were expressed in the press, which in turn fostered more 
critical press coverage of reform and public support for reform declined.  As public support 
ebbed so did the government‟s commitment to health reform.  The pattern was set in the 
1993 and 1994 Budgets.  In 1993 tough budget decisions led to cuts in health care and the 
closure of hospitals, which then led stakeholders to become more critical of the government. 
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By September and October, polls showed waning support for reform.  In response, the 
government began its retreat.  It caved in to doctors‟ demands that they be excluded from 
having to bargain with local health boards; a concession that struck at one of the key tenets of 
Wellness – local decision-making.  Similarly, in the 1994 budget the government again 
retreated, scaling back cuts to acute care, creating a new $10 million Rural Initiatives Fund 
and adding more money for home care.  As well, the government signed an agreement with 
the RHC at a cost of $1.1 million.  The better news translated into better poll results in 1994.  
But the pattern was set. Angry stakeholders expressed their criticisms in the media, which in 
turn became more critical of reform. Public support for reform waned and the government 
backed away from making more difficult choices.  
Managing the complaints of health stakeholders, even during the tough fiscal years, 
tested the government‟s ability to remain committed to its reform agenda. Simply, while each 
compromise served to momentarily moderate stakeholder anger, the fact of the matter was, 
only the fiscal crisis prevented a full scale attack by stakeholders and a retreat by the 
government. 
The arrival in 1995 of the second consecutive balanced budget and a positive fiscal 
outlook simply intensified the stakeholder‟s pressures on the government.   In essence, 
without a fiscal shield to underpin continued restraint, there was nothing to compel 
stakeholders through more reform.  Good news clearly hurt a reform message anchored on a 
fiscal crisis.  Furthermore, an election in 1995 required that the NDP government shift its 
messages away from fiscal constraint to the good news story of fiscal and economic success.  
Both the positive fiscal news and the election messaging could not sustain stakeholders 
through more years of difficult decisions and pain brought about by health reform. Frustrated 
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and angry, disillusioned and disheartened, SUN united with its nemesis, the SMA, and 
together their voices became singularly focused, joining with other stakeholders to 
vigorously oppose health reform. More importantly, with SUN‟s shift away from reform, the 
government lost an important ally and gained a powerful enemy. 
This thesis then documents that, together, these stakeholders effectively created a 
palpable sense of crisis.  Escalating and forceful stakeholders‟ criticisms into 1996, alongside 
the media‟s almost daily reports of these outpourings, eroded the public‟s support for 
ongoing health spending restraint.  More importantly, stakeholders effectively contrasted the 
government‟s good news fiscal turnaround with reports of declining patient safety, bed 
closures that left patients out in the cold, waiting lists and delays, and physicians leaving the 
province.  With these growing news stories, the government`s polls clearly illustrated the 
shift of the public in the direction of rejecting health reform.  By implication, the public‟s 
confidence in the health system fell, and so too did their support for the government.  The 
government‟s political will disappeared.  In August1996 the NDP government halted its 
health reform agenda. 
In the end, the narrative of Saskatchewan‟s five years of health reform shows that the 
government‟s reform efforts achieved mixed results.  From a policy outcome perspective, the 
changes imparted by reform are somewhat positive.  After years of having very little control 
of its health system, reform firmly implanted the government‟s oversight role.  The 
government now managed the districts funding basket, and as well, set the benchmarks for 
those funds by implementing the criteria for and approving district budgets.  The system 
revamped system rationalized services and facilities into a smaller number of health districts. 
Overall, a better organized system emerged.   
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Yet, the government also fell well short of completing a major component of reform; 
its Wellness agenda and the realignment of Saskatchewan‟s health system to focus on 
wellness, health promotion and health prevention.  Moreover, the system still remained large 
and expensive, and after two years of cuts to the health budget, annual increases in health 
spending returned. These spending grew quickly, reaching pre-reform spending levels by the 
late 1990s.  The success of health districts is also debatable. The concept of elected boards 
received tepid support from the public and a short number of years later, transformed into 
government appointed boards.  In fact the value of the boards themselves is questionable, as 
they seemingly failed to envelope community leadership, instead, themselves becoming 
another bureaucracy and ardent stakeholder.  Thus, reform‟s policy successes are debatable.  
From a stakeholder management perspective, the lessons and outcomes are more 
certain.  Key is that health reform was a product of a fiscal crisis, without which, the NDP 
would have never attempted such an extensive policy exercise.  Thus, the marshalling force 
or fiscal anchor is clearly critical for health change.  Moreover, the NDP government, 
because of its political skill and acumen, also managed to maneuver its health stakeholders 
through five years of health reform, and achieved some substantive change – again, 
regionalization, rationalization and control of the system.  Together, the crisis and the 
government‟s political skills ensured that reform lasted longer and encompassed more than 
previous experience suggested possible.   
Yet, the political costs of reform lingered long after.  Relations between the 
government and its stakeholders permanently shifted, and never again will a Saskatchewan 
government receive the level of stakeholder support for health system change achieved by 
the Romanow government.  In fact, in the years since, health stakeholders have become more 
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entrenched and defensive.  Moreover, reform did not address the chronic nature of health 
costs.  Simply, spending problems are long term in nature and thus require longer term 
solutions.  Without these longer term solutions, health spending is destined to consume funds 
that would otherwise be spent on the very programs necessary to create a healthier 
population, such as education, poverty reduction or the environment.  
Thus, implementing sound health policies requires an understanding of the political 
nature of the reform process. Again, a crisis or marshalling force is key. The fiscal crisis gave 
life to Saskatchewan‟s health reform and it held stakeholders to the difficult process. Equally 
a fiscal recovery ended that reform because in the health system the problems are chronic not 
acute. In essence, government‟s need to constantly identify new anchors for their health 
policy agenda or face losing momentum for change.  The final value of this thesis is that it 
demonstrated the magnitude of the challenges governments face when they try to confront 
their stakeholders and change a health system.  Simply, stakeholders are a significant 
obstacle to reform of the health system.  
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